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Forced Evictions, Mass Displacement, and the
Uncertain Promise of Land and Property
Restitution in Haiti
GREGER B. CALHAN*

Introduction
The 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010,
needs no introduction. Considered the western hemisphere's worst natural
disaster in recorded history,' the earthquake caused untold destruction upon
the impoverished island nation, killing hundreds of thousands and leaving
the country's physical and political infrastructure in ruins. The disaster
produced a global outpour of support and attention, as international
organizations and NGOs descended on the country en masse, providing
everything from basic humanitarian aid to high-level reconstruction
strategy. Tensions simmering since the 2004 coup d'6tat exploded with
unrest over disputed elections and the spread of cholera from an unsanitary
United Nations military base.2
Three years after the earthquake,
* Law Clerk to Judge Martha C. Daughtrey, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
J.D., New York University School of Law. I wish to thank the many people whose assistance
made this article possible-chief among them are Mario Joseph, Brian Concannon, and the staff
of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti and Bureau des Avocats Internationaux for
their courageous efforts combating the forced evictions this article describes. I also thank the
Center for Constitutional Rights for permitting the author to spend the summer of 2011 in Port-auPrince, Professor Daniel Fitzpatrick for his help in developing the initial version of this article,
and Pedro Hernandez, Jr. and the staff of the Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal for their

invaluable aid in readying it for publication. This article is dedicated to Sybil, Maude, and
Heather Chin-Calhan.
1. See Bryan Walsh, After the Destruction: What Will It Take to Rebuild Haiti?, TIME, (Jan.

16, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1953379 1953494
1954338,00.html (describing earthquake as perhaps "worst-ever natural disaster in the western
hemisphere").
2. The cholera epidemic is a source of particular tension in the country. According to
independent medical experts, the "presence of pipes pouring sewage from the [U.N. military]
camp to the stream" and "genetic fingerprinting" of the particular cholera strain leave no doubt
that Nepalese peacekeepers were the source of the outbreak. Renaud Piarroux et al.
Understandingthe cholera epidemic, Haiti, 17 Emerging Infectious Diseases (2011) available at

http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eidl707.110059 (documenting "an exact correlation in time and places
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reconstruction has faltered, hundreds of thousands remain displaced, and
Haiti's most vulnerable citizens remain in a state of acute humanitarian
criSiS.
Natural disasters do not, of course, strike in a vacuum, and the Haitian
earthquake struck a nation that was profoundly vulnerable due to many
historical and social factors. The fact that millions of Haitians were made
homeless, and that hundreds of thousands remain so, results as much from
legal and political structures as from the physical destruction of housing.
Historical disempowerment, economic exclusion, and numerous conflicted
legal principles operate both to create displacement in Haiti and prevent its
resolution;4 nowhere is this more true than in Haiti's laws and traditions
concerning the ownership and possession of land. Ownership of land and
property in Haiti is marked by informal, extra legal arrangements developed
on an ad hoc basis to deal with rapid, disorganized urbanization and an allbut absent state-a fact in tension with the strictures of the formal system.5
As a result, the disaster wreaked havoc on an already fragile legal order and
raised deeply challenging questions about land use rights, ownership, and
the legitimacy of competing claims to humanitarian assistance.
The international community, pervasively present in Haiti even before
the disaster, has necessarily assumed a major role in rebuilding Haiti's
devastated institutions and legal structures. 6 With increasingly frequent and
violent forced evictions now threatening the three hundred thousand

between the arrival of a Nepalese battalion from an area experiencing a cholera outbreak and the
appearance of the first cases in Meille[, Haiti,] a few days after."). A report by the United Nations
itself similarly found that "the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the source of
the Haiti cholera outbreak was due to contamination of the Meye Tributary of the Artibonite
7
River" by a "current South Asian type ' cholera strain. ALEJANDO CRAVIOTO, INT'L CTR. FOR
DIARRHOEAL DISEASE RESEARCH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL OF EXPERTS ON

THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN HAITI 18, 30 (2011), available at http://www.un.org/News/

dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf. The U.N. has refused to accept any responsibility
for the epidemic or take any steps to compensate victims; a lawsuit on behalf of sickened
individuals is pending in federal district court in the United States. See Complaint, George et al.
v. United Nations et al., 1:13-cv-07146-JPO (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/1 0/Cholera-Complaint.pdf.
3. See Mark Schuller, Smoke and Mirrors: Deflecting Attention Away From Failure in
Haiti's IDP Camps, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-

schuller/haiti-idp-housingb_1I 155996.html; Joseph Guyler Delva, Relief Agency Slams Haiti
Quake Recovery "Quagmire," REUTERS, Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/

06/us-haiti-quake-oxfam-idUSTRE70500T20110106. (describing failures of international aid
effort in Haiti).
4. For discussion of the sociological and historical factors at work, see Kevin Edmonds,
Beyond Good Intentions: The StructuralLimitations of NGOs in Haiti, 39 CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY

439 (2013), available at http://crs.sagepub.com/content/39/3/439.
5. See discussion, infra Part II.
6. Kevin Edmonds describes the background of humanitarian aid in Haiti, and its frequent
deployment in service of political ends. Edmonds, supra note 4, at 2-8.
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Haitians who remain in displacement camps, questions of land, property,
and housing rights are at the center of this agenda.
In response,
international actors have drawn on lessons learned from two decades of
post-Cold War mass-displacement events that have produced a growing
body of legal norms geared towards returning property to people, and
people to property. Under this emerging principle of restitution, victims of
war and disaster are entitled to demand the return of what was lost, a
restoration of the status quo ante.8 The restitutionary right has been given
practical meaning through a variety of national and international property
tribunals.
These streamlined procedures are intended to identify
meritorious land and property claims among the displaced and to restore
those legal rights. Built on these experiences in six countries,9 the United
Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and
Displaced Persons-known as the "Pinheiro Principles" after lead-author
Paulo S6rgio Pinheiro-stand as the most definitive statement of
restitutionary norms under international law.' 0
International organizations and NGOs have looked to the Pinheiro
Principles for guidance on implementing a restitution-oriented solution to
the crisis of mass homelessness and forced evictions in Haiti's displacement
camps. Because the Pinheiro Principles recognize rights for particularly
marginalized groups such as renters, 'squatters,' and other irregular rightsholders," the guidance that the principles provide is crucial.
Yet applying restitutionary principles to the practical realities of the
Haitian earthquake is more difficult than it might appear. In many
important ways, both the original crisis of mass displacement and the
"second-wave"' 2 crisis of forced eviction are occurring in a context quite
unlike those which informed the development of restitutionary norms.' 3 In
7. See

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

FOR MIGRATION,

DISPLACEMENT

TRACKING

MATRIX
V.20
(June
30,
2013),
available
at
http://www.iom.int/
files/live/sites/iom/files/pbn/docs/DTMV2_ReportJuly_2013_English.pdf.
8. See discussion, infra Part Il.A-B.
9. These were Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Georgia, Guatemala, and Kosovo.
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on Promotion & Prot. of Human
Rights, Housing and property restitution in the context of the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons: Preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur, at TT 12-44, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/11 (June 16, 2003) (prepared by Paulo S6rgio Pinheiro) [hereinafter
Preliminary Report].
10. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on
Promotion & Prot. of Hum. Rts., Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and
Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17 (June 28, 2005) [hereinafter Pinheiro
Principles].
I1. Pinheiro Principles, supra note 10, at 21, 22.
12. See INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, NEGLECT IN THE
ENCAMPMENTS: HAITI'S SECOND WAVE HUMANITARIAN DISASTER (2010) [hereinafter NEGLECT
INTHE ENCAMPMENTS].
13. See discussion, infra Part IV.
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contrast to Pinheiro's historical points of reference, Haiti was sent reeling
by natural disaster and not armed conflict. 4 Hardly any effected persons
have formal title to land or property, and the vast majority of displaced
persons were renters, 'squatters,' or informal tenure-holders before the
earthquake.' 5 The urban nature of the disaster collapses categories of
victim and secondary occupiers,' 6 and pervasive pre-earthquake poverty
makes it difficult to distinguish between those displaced by the earthquake
itself, and those rendered homeless by preexisting socioeconomic factors.'
Because of these design/implementation mismatches, I argue that
restitutionary principles should not be applied without criticism to the
Haitian context.
Instead, humanitarian actors and international
organizations should approach forced evictions and displacement in a
manner that is pro-poor--one that builds the capacity of Haiti's beleaguered
justice system and empowers local communities to be heard, to take charge
of their own fate, and to play an active role in their country's
reconstruction.18

This article proceeds in four Parts. Part I surveys conditions in Haiti's
displacement camps and the humanitarian crisis facing their residents. Part
II describes historical and contemporary land use trends that contributed to
Haiti's exceptional pre-earthquake vulnerability. Part III examines the
development of restitution as a norm under international law and its
tentative application in Haiti. Finally, Part IV critically considers whether it
is appropriate to apply restitutionary norms to post-earthquake Haiti.

1. Humanitarian Crisis
A. Displacement
The earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010 brought untold
devastation to the western hemisphere's poorest nation, killing perhaps a
quarter of a million people, rendering homeless millions more, and
destroying nearly 300,000 buildings.19 Survivors who escaped their ruined
or damaged homes sought refuge in a constellation of camps for internally
displaced persons (IDPs), occupying any and all available land, including
private lots, public parks, the Ptionville golf course, and the treeless,
landslide-prone ravines that mark Port-au-Prince's hilly landscape. 20
14. See discussion, infra Part IV.A.
15. Id. at Part IV.B.

16. Id. at Part IV.C.
17. Id. at Part IV.D.
18. Id. at CONCLUSION.
19. See Clarens Renois, Haitians Angry Over Slow Aid, THE AGE, Feb. 10, 2010 available at
http://www.theage.com.au/world/haitians-angry-over-slow-aid-20100204-ng2g.html.
20. INSTITUTE FOR THE PROTECTION AND

SECURITY OF THE CITIZEN, EUROPEAN
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Constructed from tarpaulins, tents, and other improvised materials, pressed
into close proximity and lacking basic services or police protection,
displaced communities have become an omnipresent feature of postearthquake Port-au-Prince.21
Massive urban displacement has emerged as the signature evil of the
earthquake and its aftermath. By mid-2013, three-and-a-half years after the
disaster, hundreds of thousands of Haitian citizens remain displaced, living
in conditions of extreme precarity. While the numbers are difficult to
calculate, even conservative estimates calculate that hundreds of thousands
of displaced persons were still living in camps during the summer of
2012.22 The International Organization for Migration puts the present
number of displaced persons at nearly 300,000.23
Despite the unprecedented international generosity and good will that
followed the earthquake,24 creating durable housing solutions for the
hundreds of thousands of Haitians who remain displaced is proving to be a
herculean task. "The situation in Haiti continues to be catastrophic," said
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) DirectorGeneral Irina Bokova, "[r]econstruction has scarcely begun. Of the total
amount of aid pledged, only a small fraction has been received." 25 UNICEF
Executive Director, Anthony Lake, expressed humanitarians' frustration,
calling the disaster "a humanitarian worst case scenario in one of the
world's poorest countries, with massive casualties, multiple catastrophes,
the decimation of the nation's civil service, reams of critical records
COMMISSION, HAITI FLOOD AND LANDSLIDE RISK FOR IDP CAMPS (2010) (describing exceptional

risks of landslides and flooding facing hundreds of camps-over half of the camps surveyed were
found to be at risk.).
21. See NEGLECT IN THE ENCAMPMENTS, supra note 12.

The author can attest that two

years after the earthquake, displacement camps remained painfully visible in virtually all
neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince.
22. TIMOTHY T. SCHWARTZ ET AL., BUILDING ASSESSMENTS AND RUBBLE REMOVAL IN

QUAKE-AFFECTED NEIGHBORHOODS IN HAITI, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEv. (May 13, 2011),

available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PNADY468.pdf [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, USAID
REPORT]. Schwartz calculated that between 141,000 and 375,000 individuals remain displaced as
of 13 May 2011, using methodology which differs from that used in other reports, and which has
been criticized for underreporting the extent of damage. See Over One Million Living in
"Extremely Dangerous" Houses According to USAID Report, CEPRBlog (June 2, 2011),
http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/over-one-million-living-inqextremely-dangerousq-houses-according-to-usaid-report (noting that report's estimates of camp
populations may be "methodologically questionable" because "the authors' study does not extend
to the camps themselves" and only focuses on building occupation).
23. See DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX, supra, note 7.

24. For criticism of the international community's good intentions, see Edmonds, supra note
4, at 2-8.
25. Press Release, U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, We must do more
and better for Haiti, says UNESCO

Director-General (Jan.

12,

2011)

available at

http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/we must-do-more-and
_betterforhaiti-says unesco director-general.
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destroyed and staggering damage to the country's critical infrastructure,"
noting the "enormous, unprecedented obstacles" facing reconstruction
efforts. 26
B.

Camp Conditions
These statements are not an exaggeration, for the hundreds of
thousands of Haitians who remain displaced by the earthquake face a truly
dire struggle for day-to-day survival. A lack of food, water, education,
personal safety, and rehousing are only a few of the burdens that Haiti's
displaced persons endure. For instance, food scarcity is widespread with
malnutrition threatening an alarming number of children as well as adults.27
Immediately after the earthquake, an Emergency Food Security Assessment
(EFSA) found that over half of all Haitian households suffer from food
insecurity.28 Despite these incredibly high levels and despite the EFSA's
recommendation that blanket food distribution continue,29 the government
of then-President Ren6 Pr6val ordered the international community to cease
food and water aid out of concern that the aid would "undermine Haitian
national production and Haitian trade." 30 Less than one year later, a survey
of IDP camp residents by NYU's Center for Human Rights and Global
Justice found that food insecurity had increased to even higher levels, with
85% of respondents reporting going at least one entire day without food
during the previous week. 3 1
The same NYU team also found a significant correlation between
reported food insecurity and vulnerability to sexual violence, 32 a problem
women's groups in Haiti have been attempting to highlight for at nearly two
years. According to the survey, over the one-year period following the
26. Anthony Lake, Look Beyond the Rubble, HUFFINGTON POST, (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anthony-lake/look-beyond-the-rubble-b 807643.html.
the

27. See Lucy Bassett, Nutrition Security in Haiti: Pre-and Post Earthquake Conditions and
Way Forward, 157 WORLD BANK EN BREVE 1, 2 (2010), available at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/257803-1269390034020/EnBreve
.EnglishWeb.pdf.

157

28. COORDINATION NATIONALE DE LA StCURITt ALIMENTAIRE ET AL., EXECUTIVE BRIEF
ON THE HAITI EMERGENCY FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT 1 (Mar. 8, 2010) available at

http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp217076.pdf.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Haiti's PresidentCalls for Halt top to Food Aid, TELEGRAPH ( Mar. 8, 2010) available

at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/haiti/740089 1/
Haiti-president-calls-for-halt-to-food-aid.html.
31. CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN HAITI'S IDP

CAMPS: RESULTS OF A HOUSEHOLD SURVEY (2011) [Hereinafter CHRGJ Briefing Paper] (finding

84% of all respondents reporting going at least one entire day without eating any food at all during
week prior to survey).
32. Respondents from households with victims were more likely to report that they went at
least one day without eating during the previous week. Id.
33. See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY IN HAITI ET AL., OUR BODIES ARE
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earthquake, over 14% of camp households reported at least one household
member's victimization by sexual violence. 34 This is a disturbingly high
figure by any measure, especially when considering likely underreporting
by residents. It also represents an increase from other reports' findings of
pre-earthquake levels of sexual violence.35
Few services exist for camp residents. Those that are available are
minimal and under threat. At the two-year anniversary mark, the OCHA
noted that the transition from "emergency programming" to "recovery
activities" has seen severe cuts in essential direct services provided in
camps.36 With water and sanitation funding beginning to run dry in
summer 2011, OCHA noted that, "the number of humanitarian actors able
to continue activities will be drastically reduced, which in turn will have
serious consequences on the living conditions of camps residents."37
Adding to their woes, OCHA estimated that camp residents' "level of
vulnerability will be particularly high due to the rain and hurricane
season." By June 2011, drawback in aid already began as "[a] significant
reduction in operational resources of humanitarian actors

. . .

resulted in

severe cuts in the services provided to IDP camps" leading to "serious
concerns over existing protection gaps and the unmet basic humanitarian

needs." 39
While life in the IDP camps is difficult, leaving the camps presents its
own difficulties-especially given the inadequate wages and rampant
unemployment inherent to the Haitian economy. According to one report,

STILL TREMBLING (July 2010) available at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/
2010/07/Haiti-GBV-Report-Final-Compressed.pdf; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AFTERSHOCKS:
WOMEN SPEAK OUT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN HAITI'S CAMPS (Jan. 6, 2010) available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR36/001/2011/en.
34. CHRGJ Briefing Paper, supra note 31.
35. See Athena R. Kolbe & Royce A. Hutson, Human Rights Abuse and Other Criminal
Violations in Port-au-Prince,Haiti: A Random Survey of Households, 368 THE LANCET 864,
868 (2006). Other studies, using different methodologies and covering shorter time periods, have
found lower numbers. See Athena R. Kolbe et al./Small Arms Survey & University of Michigan,
ASSESSING NEEDS AFTER THE QUAKE: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM A RANDOMIZED SURVEY
OF PORT-AU-PRINCE HOUSEHOLDS 23 (2010); Kimberly A. Cullen & Louise C. Ivers, Human
Rights Assessment in Parc Jean Marie Vincent, Port-Au-Prince, Haiti, 2 HEALTH & HUM. RTS.
61, 65 (2010).
36. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,
HUMANITARIAN
BULLETIN
4
(Mar.
25
Apr.
10,
2011)
available at
http://haiti.humanitarianresponse.info/Portals/0/Information%20Management/Ocha%2OHaiti%20
_humanitarianBulletin'%202.pdf
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Letter from Navanethem Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
to All Permanent Representatives at the U.N. Office at Geneva (June 9, 2011) available at
http://www.unhcr.org.uk/fileadmin/user-upload/images/Updates/July_201 I/Haiti.pdf.
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over 50% of the population is without work, 40 with over two-thirds lacking
jobs in the formal sector. 4 1 A recent report by the U.S. Agency for
International Development ("USAID") found unemployment to be as high
as 80%.42 Jobs that do exist are often inadequate to meet a family's needs
or occur in an informal sector characterized by insecurity and lack of
benefits. 4 3 Moreover, work within the formal sector requires possession of
a national identification card, which many Haitian citizens lack,44 and
which deportees from the U.S. find particularly difficult to obtain.45
Without employment, exit from the camps is all but impossible.
C. Forced Evictions
Within months of the earthquake, its traumatized and homeless victims
began to face a new and growing menace: A wave of forcible, illegal, and
often violent evictions from displacement camps by armed groups acting in
the name of the government and purported private landowners. An OCHA
report first raised the alarm on forced evictions a mere three months after
the disaster; 46 these evictions mushroomed in scale in the months that
followed. According to the United Nation's Protection Cluster, 28,000
people were evicted between March and October 2010,47 and the rate of
evictions reached a new high over the summer of 2011. Camps that saw
40. Trenton Daniel, Anger in Haiti as New Leader Stumbles in Politics, YAHOO NEWS,

(July 25, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/anger-haiti-leader-stumbles-politics-I 95544840.html
41. Antin Ouvriye et al., SUBMISSION TO THE U.N. UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, LABOR

RIGHTS, (Mar. 2011), http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Haiti-UPR-Labor-

Rights-FINAL.pdf. [hereinafter UPR LABOR REPORT] (citing Central Intelligence Agency, World
Factbook, Haiti (2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.
html).
42. SCHWARTZ, USAID REPORT, supranote 22, at 19.
43. UPR LABOR REPORT, supra note 41. See also Daniel, supra note 40 (describing lack of
economic opportunities as major cause of the frustration and despair now settling in over the

faltering larger recovery effort).
44. In Haiti, having an identification card means "having a say," CAN. INT'L DEV.

AGENCY, (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAD- 1l31
6214-SNX.
45. UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI IMMIGRATION CLINIC ET AL., DEPORTATIONS, DETENTION AND
DEATH: THE RESULTS OF THE U.S. DECISION TO RESUME DEPORTATIONS TO HAITI (Mar. 2011)

available at http://library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1 102611510111-32/Haiti+
Deportation+Fact+Sheet+3-9-1 1-1-1.pdf.
46. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Haiti Earthquake Situation
Report #31, (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.cinu.org.mx/haiti/docs/OCHASituationReport-No_31
-_HaitiEarthquake_-_24_March_2010[l].pdf. (first reference to evictions by OCHA, 32
months after the EQ, mostly on school grounds).
47. WALTER KALIN, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, HUMAN RIGHTS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED
44
PERSONS IN HAITI: MEMORANDUM BASED ON A WORKING VISIT TO PORT AU PRINCE

(October 2010), available at http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/l1/Kalin-Statement201 0-Haiti-English.pdf [hereinafterKllin Memo].
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either evictions or serious threats of evictions during July 2011 included
Django, 48 Stadium Cator,4 9 Barbancourt 11,50 Village de Leon, 5' and Eric
Jean-Baptiste.52 In each case, residents reported the same strong arm
tactics, including random acts of violence, threats and intimidation, homedestruction, sexual assault, and illegal arrest. 53 While these tactics represent
flagrant violations of both Haitian and international law,54 armed groups
deploy them routinely and with impunity against communities of displaced
persons. And with few, if any, exceptions, these forced evictions occur
without any serious attempt to find alternative housing for the IDPs.55
The gravity of this second displacement crisis has attracted the
attention of international and regional human rights bodies, as well as
vigorous action and dissent by Haitian human rights organizations. The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued precautionary
measures directing the Government of Haiti to end all evictions until a rehousing plan is in place. 6 Numerous representatives of international

48. Bill Quigley and Jocelyn Brooks, Displaced Women Demand Justice in Port au Prince,
COUNTERPUNCH.ORG, June 30, 2011 availableat http://counterpunch.org/quigley0630201 I.html.
49. Hundreds of Haitian Families Evictedfrom Earthquake Camps, AMNESTY INT'L (July
22, 2011), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/hundreds-haitian-families-evicted-earth
quake-camp-2011-07-22. The author was present at the forced eviction of the Sylvio Cator
Stadium encampment.
50. Letter from Mario Joseph, Managing Attorney, Bureau des Avocates Interationaux, to
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), on Forced Evictions and Request for
New Precautionary Measures (Feb. 27, 2012) available at http://ijdh.org/archives/25449
(describing forced evictions and urging new precautionary measures) [hereinafter Feburary 2012
IACHR letter].
51. Id.
52. Jocelyn Brooks and Greger Calhan, Hundreds of Displaced Families Face Violence and
Threats of Unlawful Eviction in the Carrefour Neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, IJDH.ORG

http://ccrjustice.org/hundreds-of-displaced-families-face-violence-and-threats-of-unlawfuleviction-carrefour-neighborhood (last visited April 22, 2012).
53. See Letter from Human Rights Lawyers, Law Professors and Nobel Peace Laureates, to
Ban Ki Moon et al., U.N. Secretary General (Aug. 11,
2011), available at
http://ijdh.org/archives/20866.
54. See InternationalAction Ties et al., SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL
PERIODIC REVIEW RIGHT TO HOUSING (Mar. 2011) available at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/Haiti-UPR-Housing-Report-Final-English.pdf
[hereinafter HOUSING
UPR] (discussing national and international law basis of right to housing, and due process
demands for legal evictions).
55. See Mark Snyder and Markenson Bellevue, Paying Off The Internally Displaced Haiti's Acceptable Forced Evictions? THE NEW SIGNIFICANCE (July 22, 2011), available at
http://www.thenewsignificance.com/2011/07/22/mark-snyder-and-markenson-bellevue-paying-off
-the-intemally-displaced-haiti%E2%80%99s-acceptable-forced-evictions/ (highlighting desultory
efforts to find alternative housing for those forcibly evicted from camps).
56. Inter-American Comm'n Of Human Rights, Precautionary Measures 2010, Forced
Evictions from Five Camps for Displaced Persons, Haiti, PM 367-10 (2010) available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/medidas/2010.eng.htm.
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human rights bodies have also expressed alarm.5 7 Nevertheless, both
private and state actors continue to conduct forced evictions at an
"exponentially" increasing rate. 8
Under the threat of forced evictions, the population of Haiti's
displacement camps saw a modest decline, followed by stabilization. 5 9
However, a decrease in numbers is not a sign of success in rehousing.
Given the dearth of livable alternatives, most camp residents who have
abandoned camps merely traded them for equally dangerous earthquake
damaged buildings, or other still more precarious forms of housing.60 As
unsafe as the camps are, they may be safer than returning to "the 54,314
inhabited red tagged buildings that may collapse at any moment or the
101,499 inhabited yellow tagged buildings that may collapse in heavy wind
or foul weather."6 1 Families who rented living space before the earthquake
frequently find it impossible to do so now, due to reduced housing
availability, skyrocketing rental costs in the remaining housing, 6 2 and an
inability to meet the onerous requirement of paying a full year of rent in
advance-the usual requirement from Haitian landlords. 63

57. The former head of MINUSTAH (the UN peacekeeping mission), Edmond Mulet,
denounced forced evictions in a September 2010 address to the U.N. Security Council, calling for
them to be halted by moratorium. Edmond Mulet, Address to the United Nations Security
Council, U.N. Doc. SC/10026 (Sept. 13, 2010). In April 2010, the Independent Expert on the
Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, noted that displaced Haitians "must be
protected against forced evictions which have begun" and "called for a moratorium on evictions"
until a national re-housing plan is implemented. Press Release, Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Expert Ind6pendent Michel Forst Termine sa cinquibme visite en Haiti (Apr.
29, 2010) available at http:/Iwww.ohchr.org/fr/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewslD=10012&LanglD=F. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon himself expressed
concern that decease in camp population "has not been entirely voluntary, and many camp
dwellers are at risk of forced eviction." U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, UN Will Stand
Shoulder to Shoulder with Haiti in Noble Work of building More Just, Prosperous Future,
Remarks to UN Security Council U.N. Press Release SC/10219 (Apr. 6, 2011) available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/201 1/sgsm I 3497.doc.htm.
58. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,

HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN 1 (Feb. 1-17, 2011) availableat http://haiti.humanitarianresponse.info/

Portals/0/Information%20Management/l 10124_ochahumanitarian.updatedd.pdf.
59. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN

HUMANITARIAN

AFFAIRS,

BULLETIN 3 (Mar. 10-25, 2011) at 2 available at http://haiti.humanitarian

response.info/Portals/0/Information%2OManagement/Ocha%20Haiti%20_humanitarianBulletin
%203%20English%20updatedl.pdf.
60. Id.; See also Bea Lindstrom and Jocelyn Brooks, Forced Evictions in Haiti,

COUNTERPUNCH.ORG (July 30, 2011), http://www.counterpunch.org/brooks0729201 I.html.
61. SCHWARTZ, USAID REPORT, supra note 22, at 38.
62. PROTECTION CLUSTER, HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY WORKING GROUP, ISSUE OF
RENTERS IN THE POST-DISASTER SCENARIO 2 (2010)

63. HOUSING UPR, supra note 54, at 1 5.
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II. Origins of Vulnerability
A.

Historical Context
The clear proximate cause of Haiti's mass displacement and forced
evictions crisis is the devastating earthquake of January 12, 2010. Yet this
natural disaster is not the sole cause of the damage, the vulnerability of
Haiti's people, or the contours of the humanitarian crisis that followed.
Instead, they are the product of Haiti's particular social and historical
context, demonstrating the "importance of access to economic, political,
and social power in mitigating vulnerability" to natural and man-made

disasters. 6 4
The history of modem Haiti begins with two great disasters of the
man-made kind-the first of which was the near-annihilation of the
indigenous Taino people by French and Spanish invaders beginning in the
16th century.65 The precolonial population of the island now divided
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic was large, perhaps 8 million
people.6 6 By the mid-1500s virtually none remained.6 7 The extermination
of the Taino people led to the second great man-made disaster in Haiti's
history: African slave labor. English, French, and Spanish interests in the
booming sugar cane business required human labor on a massive scale, a
need that only enslavement could supply. 68 Various colonial wars among
European powers led to the east/west division of the island that exists to this
day, 69 and, by 1789, the approximately 40,000 French settlers on the
western part of the island found themselves outnumbered more than ten to
one by the largest slave population in the Caribbean.70
Ruled by the lash and gun, Haiti, then known as Saint-Domingue,
became by far the most profitable of France's overseas colonies.71 It also
became the site of the most ruthlessly coercive and violent slave system in
the new world.7 2 With the European and North American markets' hunger
for sugar all but insatiable, Saint-Domingue's planter elite struggled to
import slaves fast enough to replace those worked to death in fields-by
64. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, 170-75 (1999) (noting that vulnerability

to famine has less to do with natural causes and is more about the alienation of the rules from
those ruled).
65. Paul Farmer, THE USES OF HAITI 60-61(1994) [hereinafter USES OF HAITI].
66. Id. at 60.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 63.
71. Id.
72. Paul Farmer, Who Removed Aristide?, LONDON REV. BOOKS (Apr. 15, 2004) available
at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/nO8/paul-farmer/who-removed-aristide [hereinafter Farmer, Who
Removed Aristide?].
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one estimate a third of all new arrivals died within their first year.73
Yet, even with the most coercive and draconian techniques, and facing
a nonwhite majority split along class and color lines, the colonial elite was
unable to contain an unrest that grew increasingly volatile by the end of the
1700s.74 Open rebellion erupted in 1791, and went through various phases
of shifting alliances and foreign intervention, bringing about the collapse of
the colonial planter elite in 1794.75 By 1804, Haiti became the western
hemisphere's second republic, and the first enslaved people to win freedom
by their own hand.76
Freedom did not bring prosperity or security, as the Haitian Republic
remained politically fragile, economically dependent on cash-crop exports,
and ringed by the openly hostile great powers of the day.77 In 1825, France
used the threat of reinvasion and occupation to demand a crippling
indemnity on the newly independent nation-effectively demanding
payment from the former slaves for their own freedom.7 8 Payments on the
debt continued until after World War II, and did much to strangle any
nascent Haitian renaissance in its crib.7 9 As Haitian anthropologist Jean
Mars-Prince explains, the debt "turned a country whose revenues and
outflows had been balanced up to then into a nation burdened with debt and
trapped in financial obligations that could never be satisfied."so
France was not the only great power hostile to the nascent Haitian
state-despite their shared history of revolution, the United States was also
deeply antagonistic to the black republic. Rather than kinship with Haiti's
revolutionaries, elites in the United States felt more solidarity with Saint
For the southern states in
Domingue's ousted planter aristocracy. 8 '
particular, themselves reliant on a racialized slave-labor caste-system,
Haiti's slave-led revolution evoked intense paranoia, fear, and antipathy.8 2
Indeed, despite being a major trading partner, the US refused to recognize
Haitian independence until the Civil War and routinely launched armed
73.
74.
75.
76.

Who Removed Aristide?,supra note 72.
USES OF HAITI, supra note 65, at 63-65.
Id.
Id. at 70-71.

77. Edmonds, supra note 4, at 2.
78. USES OF HAITI, supra note 65, at 76-77. See also Edmonds, supra note 4, at 2 ("After

numerous attempts to recolonize the newly established republic through military force alone were
defeated, the international powers of France, the USA, England and Holland put aside their
colonial rivalries in a determined effort to destroy the revolution in its infancy by bleeding it to
death financially.").
79. Id.

80. Jean Mars-Price, LA REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI ET LA REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE: LES
ASPECTS DIVERS D'UN PROBLEME D'HISTOIRE, DE GEOGRAPHIE ET D'ETHNOLOGIE (1953)
quoted in Farmer, Who Removed Aristide ?, supra note 72.
81. USES OF HAITI, supra note 65, at 72.

82. Id. ("The birth of Haiti was a nightmare for every country in which slavery endured.").
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incursions onto Haitian soil-ostensibly to protect U.S. property interests.83
These military interventions culminated in a twenty-year occupation by the
U.S. Marines, which included a "pacification" campaign which killed
perhaps 15,000 Haitian peasants, and reintroduced forced labor through the
hated corvee system.84 Even after the Marines departed in the early 19 30s,
the United States retained a strong hand in Haiti's internal affairs through
the U.S.-trained and funded Haitian army and a close, supportive
relationship with the ruthless Duvalier dictatorships.
In its most recent
form, foreign intervention in Haiti took the form of the French- and U.S.backed removal of Haiti's democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, and the imposition of a U.N. security force viewed by many
Haitians as a defacto army of occupation. 86
B. Land Use Response and Legal Norms
Trapped between rapacious foreign interests and the "incompetence
and frivolity of its leaders,"87 Haitian land use practices developed with an
eye towards survival and self-sufficiency. Drawing on pre-slavery social
traditions, Haiti emerged as a society of independent freeholders, both selfsustaining and self-regulating "to cope with geographic isolation, exclusion
from the political system, exploitative market relations, regressive taxes,
and the virtual absence of state investment in the rural sector."88 For the
vast majority of its history, Haiti's population has been overwhelmingly
rural, frequently characterized as a peasant society living removed from the
country's largely urban elite. 89 Accordingly, its property norms evolved in
83. USES OF HAITI, supra note 65, at 89.

84. Id. at 95, 97-98.
85. Edmonds, supra note 4, at 3 (describing US support for Duvalieriest regimes, the Haitian
military, and the resulting deaths of approximately 60,000 political dissidents). See also
L'Organisation des Etudiants de I'Universite de /'Etat d'Hafti, SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED
NATIONS UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY (Mar. 2011) available at
http://ijdh.org/archives/17966 [hereinafter SOVEREIGNTY UPR] (asserting view that UN

stabilization mission amounts to foreign military occupation).
86. Id. See also RANDALL ROBINSON, AN UNBROKEN AGONY 133-36 (2007); PETER
HALLWARD, DAMMING THE FLOOD (2008).
87. Jean Mars-Price, supra note 80 (quoted in Farmer, Who Removed Aristide?, supra note
72).
88. Glenn R. Smucker, T. Anderson White, and Michael Bannister, Land Tenure and the
Adoption of Agricultural Technology in Haiti 3 (Systemwide Program on Collective Action &
Prop. Rights (CAPRi), Working Paper No. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Smucker].
89. George Eaton Simpson, HaitianPeasant Economy, 25 J. NEGRO STUD. 498,499 (1940)
With few exceptions the various phases of the economic life of Haitian peasants contribute to the
maintenance of the country's social structure, and in fact, to its total social-cultural configuration.
... Notions of superordination and subordination have been inherited from the colonial period, as
have traditions of liberty and independence, and this paradoxical social heritage underlies all

relationships between members of these two socio-economic strata. Illimitable social distances
between elite and mass, as well as inescapable social near-nesses, are occasioned by objective
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the context of a weak, frequently predatory state with the near absence of
the formal legal system. 90
As a result, the rules governing land and property in Haiti are marked
by "profound dualism," with parallel systems of legal and customary norms
effectively "constitut[ing] a type of legal pluralism rather than two discrete
systems." 91 In practice, the customary system predominates strongly, 9 2 as
the formal titling system imposes significant costs on peasants seeking to
transfer land (through surveying costs and notary fees) and provides few
Consequentially, an estimated 95% of land
immediate benefits. 93
transactions in rural Haiti occur outside the formal legal system, 94 state
land-use institutions are weak, 95 and the national cadastral office has
produced records for just 5% of the country in 26 years of activity. 9 6
The informality of land transactions and lack of a functional cadastre
mean that peasant farmers in Haiti do not enjoy formal tenure security. 97
Nevertheless, robust networks of social relations and customary
arrangements have the effect of preserving a relatively high degree of land
security in practice. 98 In the countryside, land ownership is the rule, with
sharecropping or rental arrangements the exception.99 Haitian rural land
law also favors physical possession as the most powerful marker of
customary ownership. 0 0 Unusually, Haitian customary law recognizes a
clear distinction between ownership of land, and ownership of structures on
top of land-making it possible for a family to own a house, but not the
0
Rural land and property rules are thus informal but
earth beneath it.o'
differences in language, occupations, religion, recreation, family life, income, education, mobility,
and political power, and by the internalization of the ideal patterns associated with these
dissimilarities.
90. Smucker, supra note 88, at 6-8.
91. Id. at 10.

92. Id. at 504-05 (describing Haitian land law as "tacit" but nonetheless "inviolable").
93. Frito Dolisca, Population Pressure, Land Tenure, Deforestation, and Farming Systems in
Haiti: The Case of Forit Pins Reserve 25 (Aug. 5, 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Auburn
http://etd.auburn.edu/etd/bitstream/handle/10415/731/DOLISCAUniversity), available at
FRITO_25.pdfsequence=1.
94. Smucker, supra note 88, at 11.
95. Id.
96. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, DEPT. OF STATE MODERNIZATION AND
GOVERNANCE, MODERNIZATION OF CADASTRE AND LAND RIGHTS INFRASTRUCTURE IN HAITI:
A RAPID AND INCLUSIVE APPROACH 10 (2010).

97. Smucker, supra note 88, at 14.
98. Dolisca, supra note 93, at 23-25; Simpson, supra note 89 at 504-05.
99. Smucker, supra note 88, at 9 ("Identifying characteristics of [rural] Haitian land tenure
include the following ... the majority of peasant farmers are owner-operators of their own land.").
100. Id. at 15-16.
101. KELLY GEOGHEGAN, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, BRIEFING

ON HOUSING AND LAND ISSUES (2012) (on file with author). A similar split between ownership
of land and structures built upon land is present in Indonesia. See DANIEL FITZPATRICK, OXFAM
INTERNATIONAL

POLICY PAPER, ACCESS TO HOUSING FOR RENTERS AND

SQUATTERS IN
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durable, and have well served countless generations of Haitian small
farmers.
C. Urbanisation Sauvage
While the rural land tenure system may be relatively stable, the larger
rural economy has been anything but. Instability in the rural agricultural
economy coupled with the economic draw of Port-au-Prince has produced a
rural/urban demographic transformation that is largely responsible for the
devastating vulnerability of urban Haitians prior to the earthquake. Port-auPrince has long been Haiti's economic and political heart, home to over
90% of formal jobs and investment.10 2 Recent years have seen some efforts
to geographically diversify the Haiti's modest industrial base (mostly lowend textile manufacturing),o 3 but the metropole remains the center of
economic as well as political power.
Economic opportunity alone would have provided a powerful draw to
impoverished peasants living in the countryside, but the "pull factors" of
the city are only part of the urban migration story. Instead, rural-to-urban
migration has been forcefully "pushed," by economic crisis in the
countryside-a crisis which has been dramatic, recent, and driven by
external factors. While poor, Haiti was traditionally self-sufficient in
agriculture.104 Well into the 1980s, Haiti not only fed itself, but earned
foreign exchange through export.'05 Within the last three decades, however,
open-market trade policies have profoundly and perhaps forever undercut
the ability of the rural Haitian peasantry to economically sustain themselves
using traditional, small-plot farming techniques. 06 As a condition to
receive loans from the International Monetary Fund, successive Haitian
governments agreed to eliminate most tariffs on staple food products, like

TSUNAMI-AFFECTED INDONESIA 27 (2007).
102. ASA FORSMAN, UN HABITAT, A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF METROPOLITAN PORT-AU-

PRINCE, HAITI: STRATEGIC CITYWIDE SPATIAL PLANNING

17 (2010) [hereinafter SPATIAL

PLANNING].

103. Jose de Cordoba, PlannedHaitian Textile Park Provides Hopefor Jobs, WALL STREET
J., Jan
11,
2011,
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487044
58204576074152823637370.html.
104. Jean Mars-Price, supra note 80 (quoted in Fanner, Who Removed Aristide?, supra note
72).
105. Beverly Bell, Miami Rice: The Business of Disaster in Haiti, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec.
9 2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beverly-bell/miami-rice-the-business-o-b
794504.html.
106. NYU School of Law Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) et al.,
RIGHT TO FOOD, WATER AND SANITATION REPORT, SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, TWELFTH SESSION OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE UPR,

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (2011),
Edmonds, supra note 4, at 3.

http://ijdh.org/archives/17952

[hereinafter FOOD UPR];
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rice and beans. 0 7 Predictably, highly subsidized U.S. imports flooded the
Haitian market at prices Haitian farmers could not match.'0o Amid a
collapsing rural agricultural economy, peasants fled to the cities, mostly
Port-au-Prince, in massive numbers, seeking work in the textile industry or
informal sector.109 Today, Haiti is highly dependent on importation of
staple foods, and thus vulnerable to price shocks and monopolistic practices
by major food importers." 0
The millions of Haitian farmers who fled the stricken agricultural
sector to Port-au-Prince arrived in a city exquisitely unprepared to
accommodate them. As a U.N. Habitat report noted, virtually all the
growth in Port-au-Prince's size and population has been unplanned by a
process of so-called "urbanization sauvage,""' through which "the city, all
but abandoned by a weak, perhaps non-existent state, has seen its
population triple in 20 years while its infrastructure has deteriorated.""12
With new arrivals both adding to existing neighborhoods and creating new
ones, the greater Port-au-Prince area has steadily increased in both size and
density." 3 As a result, settlements have spread onto ever more marginal
land: "More than half of the informal settlements in Port-au-Prince are
located in ravines and gullies and are susceptible to inundation. Flooding is
also the main threat for those who have chosen to reside on wetland areas
close to the sea."' 14 Considering the housing situation after the earthquake,
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally
Displaced Persons, Walter Kllin, observed that even prior to the disaster the
"Haitian state and the city authorities [did] not have the capacity to manage
metropolitan Port-au-Prince." 5
To a large extent, the land and property norms applicable in Port-auPrince mirror those of the countryside. Rural Haitians moving to the city
107. JOSIANE GEORGES, TED CASE STUDIES No. 725, TRADE AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF

HAITIAN RICE (2004), available at http://wwwl.american.edulted/haitirice.htm (finding that
following agreement to the IMF conditions, Haiti's rice production plunged and never recovered).
108. Jonathon Katz, With Cheap Food Imports, Haiti Can't Feed Itself HUFFINGTON POST,
Mar. 3, 2010. Former President Bill Clinton himself forthrightly acknowledged the U.S. role in
the collapse of Haitian agriculture:
It may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a
mistake. I had to live everyday with the consequences of the loss of capacity to produce a rice
crop in Haiti to feed those people because of what I did; nobody else. Id.
109. FOOD UPR, supra note 106, at y 18.
110. Id. at if 19-21. See also JOSIANE GEORGES, supra note 107 (describing monopolistic
practices of major U.S. rice importer to Haiti).
111. SPATIAL PLANNING, supra note 102, at 18-20.
112. JEAN GOULET, LES PAUVRES QUI CONSTRUISENT LA VILLE : RESEAUX ET STRATEGIES

DANS LES BIDONVILLES DE PORT-AU-PRINCE, COLLOQUE ETUDIENT, UNIVERSITE DU QUEBEC 1
(2004) [hereinafter GOULET, LES PAUVRES] .
113. SPATIAL PLANNING, supra note 102, at 18-20.

114. Id. at 20.
115. Kalin Memo, supra note 47, at

6
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brought their highly informal, custom-bound approach to land rights with
them: Port-au-Prince too has no functional cadastre," 6 and of those who
own land, very few (perhaps as little as 20%) hold formal title to it. As in
the country-side, the costs of registering title and using formal legal
mechanisms to transfer it are prohibitively high, and most see little benefit
in using them.118 A large percentage of Haitian citizens lack national
identity papers, making participation in the formal legal land market all the
more out of reach.1 9 Likewise, even at the seat of government power, the
state remains exceptionally weak, and traditionally more focused on
maintaining its hold on power than delivering services to the poor. 20 Thus,
among Port-au-Prince's new arrivals, self-reliance and distrust of state
organs remained the rule.
Against such a daunting political and institutional backdrop, it should
come as no surprise that Port-au-Prince's remarkable growth has occurred
largely in slums, shantytowns, or, to use the French term, Bidonvilles.121
Because the Bidonvilles were never planned in any formal way, these entire
communities are on deeply insecure land security footing.12 2 Most of the
Bidonvilles sprawled out onto land that is nominally the property of the
Haitian state-thus making communities of hundreds of thousands of
people technically illegal.12 3 Despite their outlaw status within the formal
legal system, the informal market in land and construction is very much
alive in the Bidonvilles, and informal norms function adequately to regulate
daily life.124 And, one thing is clear: These informal communities are going
nowhere. Many, such as Jalousie, Fort National, and the well-known Cite
Soleil have been established for decades with multiple generations of
inhabitants.12 5 The UN Habitat Spatial Survey acknowledged as much:
116. LILIANNE FAN, OXFAM, SCOPING STUDY ON HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN POST-EARTHQUAKE HAITI, SECURING TENURE, PREVENTING EVICTIONS, FACILITATING
RETURN, AND STRENGTHENING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE VULNERABLE 5 (2010).
117. PROTECTION CLUSTER, HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY WORKING GROUP, ISSUE OF

RENTERS INTHE POST-DISASTER SCENARIO 2 (2010). Advocates on the ground in Haiti suggest

that the number may be even lower. Jeena Shah, IJDH Staff Attorney (personal communication,
Dec. 20, 2011).
118. SPATIAL PLANNING, supra note 102, at 20.
119. FAN, supra note 116, at 5.
120. USES OF HAITI, supra note 65, at 108

121. The population of Port-au-Prince was estimated at 2.5 million in 2003, twenty years
earlier it was at most 700,000. JEAN GOULET, LA GESTION URBAINE AU ANTIPODES DE LA
TECHNOCRATIE: L'EXPERIENCE DES BIDONVILLES DE PORT-AU-PRINCE 4-5 (2003) [hereinafter
GOULET, GESTION URBAINE].
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. "Bref on construit en dur, avec des materiaux de qualitd, sans grandepreoccupationa
1'gard de la clart6 des titres quant 6 la propridt dufond de terrain ou s'erige le bdtiment." Id. at

6. Cf Simpson, supra note 89, at 504-05.
125. GOULET, GESTION URBAINE, supra note 121, at 5.
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"The informal settlements and the slums of Port-au-Prince are permanent.
The people and most of the houses are there to stay. The slum cities that
have been created are permanent cities, and may change over time like any
city, but they will not disappear."l 2 6
Everywhere in Port-au-Prince, but especially in the Bidonvilles, one
major difference between urban and rural land and property systems is
apparent: the issue of ownership. As Glenn Smucker notes, pervasive
poverty notwithstanding, private ownership of land is the rule in rural
Haiti. 127 In urban Port-au-Prince and particularly its Bidonvilles, this could
not be further from the truth. In the city, the overwhelming majority of
urban Haitians are not owners-regardless of whether they are considered
under the formal or informal legal system.12 8 Instead, urban Haiti is
fundamentally a community of non-owners (in both the formal and
customary sense)-according to some estimates, up to 80% of Port-auPrince residents live as tenant or renters of some kind.12 9 While it would be
a great exaggeration to say that urban customary property norms in preearthquake Haiti "worked," they functioned well enough to guarantee a
rough minimum of predictability and foreseeability to renters and
customary owners alike.13 0 Yet when the 2010 earthquake struck, this
complicated customary system fell amidst the ruins.
D.

Land and Evictions
The earthquake came atop a perfect confluence of factors producing
structural pre-disaster vulnerability and continuing to hinder postearthquake recovery. As described above, up to 250,000 people died in the
immediate carnage of the earthquake itself, with an additional two million
displaced from 300,000 destroyed residences.' 3 1 Since few displaced
persons had resources to immediately secure alternative housing, the
immediate aftermath of the disaster saw perhaps 1.5 million people-half of
Port-au-Prince's population-take refuge in displacement camps comprised
of tents and makeshift shelters.132 Because most were renters, the spiraling
rental costs made transition to intact housing all the more difficult. Land
informality created a sort of free-for-all atmosphere in which even those
with legitimate customary claims were unable to assert them.13 3
126. SPATIAL PLANNING, supra note 102, at 28.
127. Smucker, supra note 88, at 9 ("Identifying characteristics of [rural] Haitian land tenure
include the following ... the majority of peasant farmers are owner-operators of their own land.")
128. FAN, supra note 116, at 27.
129. Id. at 28. See also KAlin Memo, supra note 47, at 7.
130. See GOULET, GESTION URBAINE, supra note 121, at 6 (describing rough functionality
of urban land norms).
1-2.
131. HOUSING UPR, supra note 54, at
132. Id. at 2
133. LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN HAITI, ISSUE BRIEF, USAID (2010).
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Compounding land informality, Haiti's weak legal order was further
fragmented by the disaster. The buildings that housed Haiti's chief legal
institutions were mostly destroyed, and many of Haiti's top judicial and
legal officials were killed.13 4 While formal legal rights to land and property
had never been strong, the disaster shattered the customary networks that
provided functional security to the majority of urban Haitians.'3 5 As a
result, "new and old property claims are up for grabs,"'"6 as post-disaster
chaos risks increasing the "concentration of land in the hands of those with
the ability to take advantage of the disruptive circumstances following a

disaster."l 3 7
Despite a brief period of solidarity following the earthquake,' 38 forced
evictions in the displacement camps began soon afterwards. Within a year
of the earthquake, OCHA reported "expulsion crisis"' 3 9 and warned of
"exponential" growth in evictions if unchecked.14 0 Defined as "[t]he
permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families
and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy,
without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other
protection,"' 4 1 forced evictions are illegal under both international' 4 2 and
Haitian national law.'43 Illegality notwithstanding, an estimated 234,000
134. This includes the Ministry of Justice, and the Palaisde Justice which houses the main
Haitian courts. See Vivienne O'Connor, The Rule of Law in Haiti After the Earthquake, 18 U.S.
INST. OF PEACE PEACEBRIEF 1 (2010).
135. GOULET, LES PAUVRES, supra note 112, at 4-5.
136. LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS INHAITI, ISSUE BRIEF, USAID (2010).
137. Id.
138. Robyn Kerr, Haitians helping Haitians as eviction looms, RELIEFWEB.NET, Apr. 27,
2011, availableat http://reliefweb.int/node/398650.
139. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,
CLUSTER PROTECTION HAITI, RAPPORT SUR LA SITUATION DE LA PROTECTION, July - August
2010,
available
at
http://oneresponse.info/Disasters/Haiti/publicdocuments/Forms/
DispForm.aspx?lD=188.
140. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,
HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN 1 (Feb. 1-17, 2011) availableat http://haiti.humanitarianresponse.info/
Portals/0/Information%2OManagement/1 10124_ochahumanitarian-updatedd.pdf ("IDP return
and relocation are pressing issues, as threats of camp evictions are predicted to rise. ... Evictions
arepredicted to rise exponentially.").
141. See U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment 7: The Right to
Adequate Housing (art. 11.1 of the Covenant); Forced Evictions, 1 15 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/4
(May 20, 1997).
142. For a more detailed discussion of international legal norms governing forced evictions
and the right to adequate housing, see Part Ill.
143. Haitian civil procedure allows eviction (or action possessoire) but only with clear
protections in place for the evictees. See Kilin Memo, supra note 47, at T 48. International due
process norms also apply, including:
(a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected;(b) adequate and reasonable notice
prior to the scheduled date of eviction; (c) the timely provision of information in an accessible
format on the eviction and future use of the land;(d) the presence of Haitian government officials
during the eviction(e) the proper identification and registration of all persons being evicted;(f) the
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individuals were affected by forced eviction by March 2011, with over
165,000 (approximately a quarter of all displaced persons) currently living
under its threat.144 With private and state evictions increasing, forced
evictions represent one of the most pressing human rights challenges to
Haitians living displaced in camps today.

III. Restitution of Land and Property
International law is not silent on the problems of mass-displacement,
forced-eviction, and homeless produced by disaster and conflict. Recent
decades have seen the development of a growing body of norms and
principles that address-under the name of restitution-theseproblems and
seek remedies for those affected.
Under a restitution framework,
individuals wrongfully forced from their homes and divested of their
property enjoy a restitutionary right-that is "an equitable remedy, or a
form of restorative justice, by which persons who suffer loss or injury are
returned as far as possible to their original pre-loss or pre-injury
position." 4 5 Restitution, then, is fundamentally about reconstructing the
status quo ante.146
Scholars of international law are divided on the extent to which
restitution as a remedy for human rights violations represents an expression
of long-established human rights norms, 147 or whether it is a new and
relatively unsettled development in the law.148
Historically,
massdisplacement was not always seen as a crisis-involuntary population
transfers were once considered a legitimate and pragmatic tool for states.14 9
While the post-World War II Universal Declaration of Human Rights
declared that "[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and return to his country,"'5o western nations emphasized the right of

prohibition of evictions during bad weather or at night; (g) provision of legal remedies and, where
needed, legal aid [to] seek such redress.
144. NICOLE PHILIPS, UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF LAW, CENTER FOR LAW
AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, ET AL., HAITI'S HOUSING CRISIS: RESULTS OF A HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON
THE PROGRESS OF PRESIDENT MICHEL MARTELLY'S 100-DAY PLAN TO CLOSE SIX IDP CAMPS 4
(2011) [hereinafter PHILIPS, HOUSING].

145. Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at 8.
146. Id.
147. Giulia Paglione, Individual Property Restitution: from Deng to Pinheiro - and the
Challenges Ahead, 20, INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 391, 391 (2008).
148. Megan Ballard, Post-conflict property restitution: flawed legal and theoretical
foundations, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 462,481-83 (2010).
149. See Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass
Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent?, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1091, 1115-16 (1998) (describing
historical examples of mass population transfer).
150. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (1ll), U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 10
(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].

Winter 2014]

FORCED EVICTIONS

177

exit over the right of return during the Cold War.' 5 ' By the late 1980s,
however, the right of return increasingly emerged as a way to address the
problem of refugee populations,15 2 and it is just a short intuitive leap from
the right to return home to the right to have your home returned to you.'53
As we will see, restitutionary principles, particularly as embodied in
the Pinheiro Principles, stand poised to play an important role in the
development of a rights-based recovery effort in Haiti.154 But restitution,
like Haiti's pre-disaster vulnerability, did not evolve in an ahistorical
vacuum. Instead, to understand the content of the right to restitution as
applied to displaced people in Haiti, it is important to understand how that
principle evolved, and the historical context that gave it birth.
A. Development of Restitution: From the Balkans Onward
Above all, the evolution of restitution as a legal norm occurred in and
was shaped by the tumultuous decades following the end of the Cold
War.'5 5 In particular, contemporary principles of land, property, and
housing restitution were informed by the international community's
experience with the violent dissolution of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.1 56 In what proved to be of lasting influence, the
return of peace in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo was coupled with
the return of land and property through internationally mediated legaladministrative schemes.' 57
No less than Haiti, the Bosnian conflict produced grave dislocation and
human suffering, transforming what had been "an ethnically mixed
community into a divided country whose ethnic groups lived in divided
areas," and producing over two-and-a-half million refugees and IDPs. 5 8
Only 42% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's population remained in their pre-war
housing by the time of the peace accords, 5 9 and much of the country's
151. Rosand, supra note 149, at 1119.
152. Ballard notes that this was not for entirely altruistic reasons-wealthy states often
found themselves desirous to motivate their refugee populations to go home. Ballard, supra note
148, at 481-483.
153. But see Ballard, supra note 148, at 467 (disputing intuitiveness of implying the right to
restitution from the right to return).
154. The Pinheiro Principles in the Haitian context are discussed, infra, in Part IV.
155. See Jemima Garcia-Godos, Addressing Land Restitution in Transitional Justice 28
NORDIC J. HUM. R 122,126 (2010).
156. Id.
157. See Leopold von Carlowitz, Resolution of Property Disputes in Bosnia and Kosovo:
The Contribution to Peacebuilding, 12 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 547, 549 (2005); Paglione, supra
note 147, at 394.
158. Carlowitz, supra note 158, at 549.
159. Rhodri C. Williams, Post-Conflict Property Restitution and Refugee Return in Bosnia
and Herzegovina: Implicationsfor International Standard-Setting and Practice, 37 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 441, 478 (2005) [hereinafter Williams, Post-Conflict].
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housing stock was abandoned outright. 160 In response, the international
representatives negotiating the end of the conflict inserted an "Agreement
on Refugees and Displaced Persons" 6 1 into the Dayton Peace Accord, 162
declaring:
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return
to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored
to them property of which they were deprived in the course of
hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that
cannot be restored to them.' 6 3
The agreement set up a property claims commission tasked with
The end of armed
deciding claims for restitution of real property.'"
conflict in Kosovo saw similar conditions of mass displacement and
homelessness, and the creation of a property claims commission modeled

on the Bosnian example.16 5
Despite the formidable obstacles facing them-which included all the
physical and social wreckage of war and ethnic cleansingl 66 -the
restitutionary systems set up in Bosnia and Kosovo are generally considered
qualified successes.16 7 The Bosnian and Kosovo commissions, in concert
with local authorities, closed hundreds of thousands of cases, either
returning property to its rightful owner, or at least returning title to clear the
way for sale.16 8 Although failing to lead to the hoped-for ethnic reintegration of ethnically cleansed communities, supporters point to the
Bosnian and Kosovan restitution process as enhancing rule of law and

160. Rhodri C. Williams, The Significance of Property Resrtiturtion to Sustainable Return in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 44 INT'L MIGRATION 40,43 (2006) [hereinafter Williams, Significance].

161. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 7,
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons (1995) [hereinafter Dayton Agreement].
162. The Dayton Peace Accords brought a formal end to the Bosnian conflict. See U.S.
Dep't of State, Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nov. 30, 1995,
available at www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/.
163. Dayton Agreement, Annex 7, supra note 161.
164. Id. Von Carlowitz, supra note 157, at 550.
165. Id.
166. These include lingering ethnic tensions, occasional flashes of violence, obstructionism
on the part of local officials, underfunding, widespread secondary occupation, and, in many cases,
a lack of interest in return on the part of the displaced. Paglione, supra note 147, at 394-96; Von
Carlowitz, supra note 157, at 550
167. See, e.g., LAND AND CONFLICT at 47; HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, REPORT ON THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOSNIA AND

HERZEGOVINA (2003) § 5, available at http://www.bh-hchr.org/Reports/reportHR2003.htm
(noting "successful process of return of property to refugees and displaced persons"). [hereinafter
HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS]; Von Carlowitz, supra note 157, at 550, 553.

168. Von Carlowitz, supra note 157, 550-54, 558.
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supporting, albeit imperfectly, reconciliation between communities.16 9
B.

From Bosnia to the Pinheiro Principles-Land and Property
Restitution Goes Mainstream

With this aura of (at least qualified) success, the Balkan experience
took on an important role in shaping the development of the restitution
model in international law. Heavily drawing on its example, the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights produced a formal set of guidelines
governing the technical, legal, and administrative aspects of property
restitution for displaced persons. Named for their principle author, U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and
Internally Displaced Persons, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the "Pinheiro
Principles" remain the last word on property restitution from the
international system.17 0
The Pinheiro Principles are comprised of seven sections that explain a
total of 23 specific principles.
A first block of sections address
international human rights norms broadly. 7' Section V, the longest, is
composed of a second block of principles, which "contain the core of the
legal and technical guidelines for establishing a property restitution
system." 7 2 In the first group, Principle 2.1 lays out Pinheiro's fundamental
conception of restitution as a remedy for an unlawful or arbitrary violation
of some other right,173 emphasizing the return of displaced persons "in
safety and dignity."' 74 The Principles also recognize a right to nondiscriminatory treatment,' adequate housing,'
peaceful enjoyment of
property,'177 and protection from forced eviction.' 78
Thus, although
restitution is primarily a backwards-looking remedy, the invocation of
broader human rights norms demonstrates the Principles' intent to "speak
not only to the issue of providing a remedy (i.e., restitution) to those
persons already displaced, but also to seeing that the crisis of displacement
is itself averted." 79
169. Von Carlowitz, supra note 157, at 558. See also Williams, Significance, supra note

160, at 39.
170. See Pinheiro Principles, supra note 10.
171. Id. §§lI-IV.

172. Ballard, supra note 148 at 477.
173. Pinheiro Principles, supra note 10, 2.1 ("All refugees and displaced persons have the
right to have restored to them any housing, land and/or property of which they were arbitrarily or
unlawfully deprived, or to be compensated for any housing, land and/or property that is factually
impossible to restore as determined by an independent, impartial tribunal.").
175. Id. at Principle 3.
175. Id. at Principle 3.
176. Id. at Principle 8.
177. Id. at Principle 7.
178. Id. at Principle 5.
179. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of
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Section V of the Principles provides technical guidance for how this
goal is to be accomplished, describing procedural administrative
mechanisms,180 enforcement measures,' 81 and, importantly, substantive
protections for renters and non-owners,' 82 and for secondary occupiers.18 3
Because of the centrality of renters and secondary occupiers to the social
landscape in Haiti, we will return to these sections below.' 84 Overall, the
influence of Balkan experiences is pronounced. Principle 12.6 adopts the
approach from Dayton, recommending inclusion of property restitution
schemes as part of post-conflict peace agreements,185 and Principle 12.5
envisions hybrid national/international mechanisms "[w]here there has been
a general breakdown in the rule of law."1 8 6 The particular challenges of the
Balkan conflicts are considered at length in the Preliminary Report which
led to the final Principles.' 87
A Sound Foundation? The International and Domestic Legal Basis
for Restitution
While the Pinheiro Principles' conception of land, property, and
housing restitution has been hailed as representing important progress in the
protection of displaced persons,'88 restitution's basis within international
law is less clear. One question turns on the relationship between the right to
restitution and the right to return.' 89 There is also debate over whether
restitution is best characterized as purely a remedy, or rather as a
freestanding right of displaced persons.190 More importantly for Haiti, the
right to restitution also draws strongly on both the right to property, and the
C.

Hum. Rts., Explanatory Notes on the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees
and Displaced Persons, 1 14, U.N. Doc- FJCN.4/Sub.2/2005/17/Add (July II, 2005) [hereinafter
Explanatory Notes] (prepared by Paulo S6rgio Pinheiro).
180. Pinheiro Principles, supra note 10, 11-15.
181. Id. at Principle 20.
182. Id. at Principle 21.
183. Id. at Principle 22.
184. See discussion, infra Part IV.C.
185. Id. at Principle 12.6.
186. Id. at Principle 12.5.
187. Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at TT 14-29 (discussing restitution programs in
Croatia and Bosnia). Although the Kosovo conflict and aftermath is addressed only in passing in
the Preliminary Report, id. at 42, it "undoubtedly influenced" the drafters. Anneke Rachel Smit,
Housing and Property Restitution and IDP Return in Kosovo, 44 INT'L MIGRATION 63 (2006).

188. Williams, Significance, supra note 160, at 39 (praising the Pinheiro Principles for
"shift[ing] the focus from the highly politicized concept of return to a more impartial 'rule of law'
approach, connoting an emphasis on individuals' rights to their former homes.").
189. Paglione, supra note 147.
190. See Rebecca J. Barber, Protecting the Right to Housing in the Aftermath of Natural
Disaster:Standards in InternationalHuman Rights Law, 20 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 432, 444-451
(2008) (describing debate).

Winter 2014]

FORCED EVICTIONS

181

right to adequate housing.191
Despite the assertion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that "everyone has the right to own property," 9 2 tensions between rival
blocs and hostility of the USSR prevented the right to property from
becoming clearly established in the core instruments of international law. 193
Indeed, by the end of the Cold War, doubts remained regarding the degree
to which the right to property ought to be considered an international legal
norm at all.194 Regional human rights treaties, however, have adopted
stronger express recognitions of the property right. In the American setting,
both the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,195 and its
successor document, the American Convention on Human Rights recognize
the right to own property.196 The right to private property is also guaranteed
by Haiti's own constitution (with allowance, however, for the public
interest). 197

Considered "among the most recognized of the economic, social and
cultural rights,"' 9 8 the right to adequate housing is firmly established under
international law,' 99 and is expressed in a number of other international and
regional instruments to which Haiti has acceded. These include the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD), which places "[t]he right to housing" among
those rights to be enjoyed without discrimination,200 and the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which recognizes a right "to
a standard of living adequate for the child's physical mental, spiritual,
moral and social development." 201 The International Convention on the
191. Paglione, supra note 148, at 395.
192. Universal Declaration, supra note 150, art. 17(1).
193. Paglione, supra note 147.
194. Notes from the President: InternationalLaw After the Cold War, AM. SOC. INT'L L.
NEWSLETTER (1993) (noting that "although a right to property is included in the Universal
Declaration, it does not appear in either of the major Covenants or in UN sponsored
conventions.").
195. Organization of American States, American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, OEA/Serv.L/V/ll.23, art. 23 (May 12, 1948) [hereinafter American
Declaration].
196. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
21, opened for signatureNov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force
July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].
197. HAITI CONST. art. 36, 36-3 (1987).
198. Charles W. Gould, The Right to Housing Recovery After Natural Disasters, 22 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 170, 174 (2009).
199. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment 4: The right to

adequate housing, 8, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991) [hereinafter General Comment 4].
200. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art
5(e)(iii), adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
201. See International Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 27(1), adopted Nov. 20,
1989 U.N.T.S. 3 1989 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).

182

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11I

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
also includes references to adequate housing as a right,202 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights includes housing as a component element of
the right to an adequate standard of living.203
More specifically to Haiti, the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man recognizes the right to housing as part of the larger right to
adequate health. 2 04 Further fortifying this right, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)-a regional body responsible for
interpreting State Parties' human rights obligations-has expressly adopted
the United Nations' Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Guiding
Principles) 205 as the authoritative statement of housing rights within the
Inter-American System.206 The Guiding Principles establish that displaced
persons have a right to "basic shelter and housing," and the "right to be
protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place
of habitual residence," even in cases of natural disaster.207 Through Haiti's
ratification of Articles 33 and 62 of the Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights, the Guiding Principles have the force of national law in the
country. 208
Finally, the Constitution of Haiti itself establishes "the right of every
citizen to decent housing, education, food and social security." 209 While
there is not a body of accessible case law elaborating the meaning of this
right, it should be understood to incorporate international standards such as
the American Convention, and Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement.2 10

202. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, art. 14(2)(h), adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
203. Universal Declaration, supra note 150, art. 25(1).
204. American Declaration, supra note 195, art. X1.
205. U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, P2, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
206. Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in
Colombia, Chapter 6, 1 10, OEA/Ser. L/V/Il.102 (Feb. 26, 1999) available at http://www.
cidh.oas.org/countryrep/colom99en/chapter-6.htm.
207. Guiding Principles, supra note 177, 18.2(b); 6.1; 6.2(d).
208. Articles 33 and 62 of the American Convention on Human Rights permit States Party to
accept the binding jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
Under article 276-2 of Haiti's national constitution, all treaties are automatically self-executing
and abrogate contrary provisions of national law. HAITI CONST., art. 276-2. Thus, when the
IACHR elaborates Haiti's obligations under the American Convention, those judgments have the
same binding effect as those of national courts.
209. HAITI CONST., art. 22.

210. Id. at art. 276-2.
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IV. Restitution in Haiti: An Improper Fit
Whatever the international legal foundations of restitution, its
principles are considered established enough to provide a reference point
for international actors addressing land and property issues in postearthquake in Haiti. Because Haiti is home to a unique concentration of
NGOs and international agencies-some derisively refer to it as the
"republic of NGOs" 2 1'-international legal principles are comparatively
more important than in stable states with well-functioning national judicial
systems. The highly visible, highly militarized presence of United Nations
peacekeepers also depends for legitimacy on compliance with international
legal norms.2 12
To a significant extent, the international organizations and NGOs
which have taken leading roles in Haiti's relief and recovery are relying on
both restitutionary principles generally, and on the Pinheiro Principles in
particular.213 While these principles represent a natural place to look for
contemporary post-disaster legal norms, there are reasons to doubt whether
restitution actually offers sound guidance for extricating Haiti from its
present crisis. On the contrary, this section argues that for four related
reasons, the restitution-centered thinking championed by Pinheiro is
inappropriate, or at least questionable, in Haiti.
First, as a matter of their historical development, the Pinheiro
Principles are grounded in lessons learned from post-conflict settings, and it
is unclear whether they were intended to or are able to adapt to the very
different situation of post-disaster recovery. Second, the thrust of the
Pinheiro Principles are premised on a level of land formalism altogether
absent in Haiti, where the overwhelming majority of IDPs are renters,
211. See, e.g., Haiti: The republic of NGOs?, AL JAZEERA, Jan. 13, 2012, available at
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestoryamericas/2012/01/20121131111 2785532.html;
Edmonds, supra note 4, at 2-8 (describing harmful effects of politicized aid in Haiti).
212. According to many critics, the UN mission in Haiti essentially amounts to an armed
occupation. Following the coup d'etat of 2004, heavily armed U.N. military units conducted
bloody pacification campaigns in neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince still loyal to elected president
Aristide. See HALLWARD, supra note 86; ROBINSON, supra note 86; SOVEREIGNTY UPR, supra
note 85. Notably, the U.N. has attempted to immunize itself against legal liability for any
misdeeds committed during the course of the mission-legal immunity which is now being
challenged in the context of the cholera outbreak. See Complaint, George et. al. v. United Nations,
et. al., No. 1:13-cv-07146-JPO (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9 2013) (describing U.N. attempts to skirt
accountability by invoking immunity doctrines).
213. In two examples of many, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) refers to
Pinheiro among their "key technical guidance documents" for Haiti, IASC, Technical Reference:
Haiti, https://sites.google.com/site/shelterhaiti20 10/technical-info/technical-reference (last visited
Apr. 23, 2012), and the Protection Cluster use them as a basis for elucidating the international
community's obligations towards renters and owners. PROTECTION CLUSTER, HOUSING, LAND
AND PROPERTY WORKING GROUP, ISSUE OF THE RENTERS IN THE POST-DISASTER SCENARIO 3
(2011).
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squatters, or in other situations of informal land tenure. Third, the Haitian
displacement context turns traditional concerns about secondary occupation
on their head-virtually all Haitian IDPs are simultaneously secondary
occupiers and earthquake victims, and assertions of the right to land
restitution unavoidably come at their expense. Finally, by focusing on
displacement proximately caused by a wrongful act, restitutionary
principles contribute to a harmful and inaccurate distinction between
'deserving' victims, who were displaced by the earthquake, and
'undeserving' victims, who are displaced, but for reasons only indirectly
caused by the earthquake.2 14
A. The Principles' Conflict-Centered Approach Is a Poor Fit for
Displacement Caused By Natural Disaster
Throughout the development of the contemporary right to restitution, it
is clear that the focus has squarely been upon post-conflict, rather than postdisaster, situations.2 15 As Charles Gould puts it:
Especially in regards to housing rights, victims of natural disasters
are a conceptual appendage to a system designed for victims of
conflict . . . consequently, persons displaced by natural disasters

can find themselves relying for protection on provisions that arose
out of very different types of events and which my inelegantly
apply to disaster scenarios.2 16
Likewise, the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Raquel
Rolnik, argued that the legal regime for post-disaster housing remains
poorly developed compared to similar situations following conflict, 217 a
position with which other high U.N. officials 2 18 and international legal
scholars agree.2 19
214. For example, indirect causes of displacement may include loss of livelihood, or being
"priced-out" of rental housing by soaring costs.
215. See Gould, supra note 198, at 193-94.
216. Id.
217. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate
Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-discrimination in this Context, Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur, Delivered to the U.N. Human Rights Council, 1 12, Doc. AIHRC/16/42 (Dec. 20,
2010) (by Raquel Rolnik) [hereinafter Rep. ofthe Special Rapporteur, 2010]; Special Rapporteur

on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the
Right to Non-discrimination in this Context, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate
Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, Delivered to the U.N.
Human Rights Council, 1 4 n.4, Doc. A/66/270 (Aug. 5, 2011) (by Raquel Rolnik)
[hereinafter Rep. ofthe Special Rapporteur,2011].

218. See, e.g., Kllin Memo, supra note 47, at 25 (criticizing humanitarian actors for
relying on "assistance models largely transposed from rural or armed conflict settings").
219. See Ballard, supra note 148, at 434. Indeed, one scholar has called the law of natural
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The focus on conflict rather than natural disaster is readily apparent in
both the history and text of the Pinheiro Principles. As described above,220
the armed conflicts of the Balkans and their aftermath deeply informed the
conception and drafting of the Principles, with the formal restitution
mechanism of Bosnia and Herzegovina proving especially influential. 22 1 Of
the six country-specific restitution programs relied upon by the Pinheiro
Preliminary Report, every one of them involved restitution following
conflict and not natural disaster. 222
Indeed, the connection between Pinheiro's restitutionary model and the
specific conflicts that informed it is sufficiently strong enough that some
scholars and U.N. humanitarian officials have questioned their applicability
outside of armed-conflict as a matter of both intent and textual
construction. 22 3 This split in opinion mirrors a larger debate within
international legal circles-whether persons displaced by natural disasters
properly fall within the IDP category at all.224 The bare text of the Pinheiro
Principles themselves are ambiguous regarding applicability outside of
armed conflict-they contain no references to "natural disaster," and
arguably apply only to situations of "arbitrary or unlawful deprivation" of
land housing or property.225
Most authorities who have considered the matter do favor both the
applicability of Pinheiro to natural disasters 226 and the inclusion of those
disasters the neglected "stepchild of conflict law." Gould, supra note 198, at 194.
220. See Part III infra.
221. See Anneke Rachel Smit, Housing and Property Restitution and IDP Return in Kosovo,
44 INT'L MIGRATION 63 (2006) (influence of Kosovo); Paglione, supra note 147, at 394 (influence
of Bosnia). As Raquel RohInik puts it, "[t]he Principles must also be read against the particular

context in which they were developed. . . . [T]hey were shaped by the experience of formal
restitution mechanisms operating at the time, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur,2011, supra note 217, at

28.

222. Preliminary Report, supra note 9, at
12-44. The countries formally considered in the
Preliminary Report include Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Georgia, Guatemala, and,
briefly, Kosovo.
223. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, 2011, supra note 217, at 8 & n.17 (describing
debate within international legal community); Ballard, supra note 148, at 468-69 & n.30 (same).
224. See Roberta Cohen, KEY POLICY DEBATES INTHE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT FIELD 4
(Dec. 4, 2006), http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/2006 RCstmtTESEVsymposium.pdf

(describing debate). For a view that the term IDP ought to apply only to those displaced by armed
conflict, see STEPHEN CASTLES ET AL., REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, OXFORD UNIVERSITY,
DEVELOPING DFID'S POLICY APPROACH TO REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 12

(2005) ("It seems best to use the IDP label only for persons displaced by violence.").
225. Pinheiro Principles, supra note 10, Principle 1.
226. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. AGENCY ET AL., HANDBOOK ON HOUSING & PROPERTY
RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES & DISPLACED PERSONS: IMPLEMENTING THE 'PINHEIRO

PRINCIPLES'

10 (2007),

available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/all31e/all31e0l.pdf

(emphasizing expansive applicability of Pinheiro and intent to reach all displaced persons,
regardless of cause). See also Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, 2011, supra note 217, at 6

(asserting that the Pinheiro Principles are "relevant guidance" in post-disaster situation); Gould,
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displaced by natural disaster within the IDP framework.22 7 Accepting,
however, that the Pinheiro Principles and restitutionary norms do have
applicability outside of the armed-conflict setting, the question remains
should they? While similar in their degree of human suffering, in key ways
the two situations are not comparable. Put simply, a humanitarian crisis
that follows an earthquake is different than one following a war. In an
armed conflict, all displacement is likely to be the result of "arbitrary or
unlawful" action by some armed, belligerent actor-a wrongdoer. By
contrast, an earthquake or flood may be arbitrary, in the sense that Acts of
God are arbitrary, but they are not "arbitrary and unlawful" in the sense that
Pinheiro seems to envision it. Of course, both the invasion of land by IDPs
and their subsequent eviction by landowners or the government may well fit
the "arbitrary or unlawful" definition,22 8 but this is an intervening, and not
proximate, cause of the displacement (an important distinction, and one to
which we return).229
The needs of IDPs are also different, depending on whether their
displacement has natural or man-made causes. Conflict IDPs are more
likely to require protection (although protection is important following
natural disasters as well) and will possess a heightened concern with
unlawful secondary occupation. Disaster IDPs may be more focused on
reconstruction and vulnerability mitigation. Peace agreements are a natural
place to include restitution mechanisms, 230 but no such "peace deal"
moment exists following a disaster. Furthermore, the mechanisms
envisioned by Pinheiro are based on the goal of transferring land or
property from the wrong-doing party back to the original and rightful owner
or occupant. In a disaster setting, where there is mass displacement and
property destruction but no human actor to blame, the logic of the
restitutionary model breaks down. Put simply, when transposed to disaster
relief, approaches adapted for conflict settings may simply not work very
well.23 1
B. Land Rights Formality: A Precondition to Restitution that Haiti
Manifestly Lacks
The restitutionary approach breaks down in Haiti for a second reason,
this time concerning the formality, regularity, and clarity of land tenure and
supra note 198, at 194-96 (describing view of drafters that Pinheiro Principles apply to all IDPs).
227. See Cohen, supra note 224, at 4 (describing consensus view that those displaced by
natural disasters are IDPs).
228. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, 2011, supra note 217, at 19.

229. For a discussion of the proximate causation of displacement, see infra Part IV.D.
230. See Pinheiro Principles, supra note 10, 12.6 (affirmatively stating that restitution
mechanisms should be a part of all peace agreements where mass displacement has occurred).
231. See Kain Memo, supra note 47, at T 25.
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ownership. As described above, the Pinheiro principles are largely derived
from the international community's experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which was "a context of largely formal registration of private property and
of what Yugoslav law called 'socially-owned' apartments."232 Of course,
land title records in the former Yugoslavia left much to be desired: 30% of
the original land registers were destroyed during the Second World War,
others were destroyed during the wars of the 1990s, record keeping was less
than 100% even during peace time, and a national cadastral system only
reached approximately 50% of the country.23 3 Nevertheless, as imperfect as
the Bosnian land record may have been, it was a model of robustness
compared to the de minimus formal record keeping in Haiti.234 To the
extent that the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo are considered qualified
successes, 235 their success must be considered in that light.
It is also important to recall that while the restitution mechanisms in
Bosnia and Kosovo are generally considered to have succeeded, they
produced winners and losers as well-and the losers were drawn from
among those who lacked formal title, operated outside of the formal system,
and rented rather than owned. In Bosnia, for instance, Rhodri Williams
notes that, "restitution did little for those who did not have their own
property or homes prior to the conflict, or, as in the case of many in the
Roma minority, did not have recognized title to them." 236 In Kosovo as
well, to the extent that property restitution was successful, it benefitted
those with the ability to prove the legitimacy of their claim through formal
means.
Consequently, large communities of Roma, Ashkaeli, and
Egyptians who had obtained their land through informal transactions were
essentially precluded from participation in the restitution process.2 37 To a
great extent, then, possession of formal legal documents and participation in
the formal legal system is a key measure of an individual's ability to benefit
from land and property restitution.
232. Rep. ofthe Special Rapporteur,2011, supra note 217, at 128.
233. LAUREL ROSE, JOACHIM THOMAS, JULIE TUMLER, DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FOR
INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, LAND TENURE ISSUES IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES THE
CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 12-13 (2005), available at http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente

/bib/05-0164.pdf.
234. See Smucker, supra note 88, at 11 (describing extremely low participation in formal
land system).
235. See discussion supra Part Ill.
236. See Williams, Post-Conflict,supra note 159.
237. Jose Maria Arraiza & Massimo Moratti, Getting the Property Questions Right: Legal
Policy Dilemmas in Post-Conflict Property Restitution in Kosovo (1999 - 2009), 21 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 421, 434 (2009). See also Jose-Maria Arraiza & Linda Ohman, Displaced Kosovo
Roma and Property Rights, 32 FORCED MIGRATION REv. 43, 44 (2009) (describing how Kosovo

Roma, who lack identity documents and own land informally through ancient customary law
practice, "present [a] nightmarish property situation, which drives human rights organizations,
legal aid offices and well-intentioned international agencies to despair.").
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By this standard, there is every reason to be doubtful about relying on
a similar approach in Haiti. As described above, Haitian transactions in
land are marked above all by their informality, and the national land
registration system is notable chiefly for its absence.238 Indeed, top
humanitarian officials in Haiti have expressed concern about the
adaptability of restitution principles to the highly informal Haitian context.
For Raquel Rohlnik, the Pinheiro principles implicitly suggest that renters
and non-owners have a lesser right to restitution than do owners. 2 39 She
also acknowledges that international restitutionary norms were adopted in
response to certain types of crises-namely those with formally registered
housing-and that while Pinheiro's model antecedents did much for
owners, they provided little relief for renters and those outside the formal
system.240 Indeed, this is precisely what has happened in Haiti following
the disaster, with many humanitarian actors adopting approaches to
reconstruction that "focus[ed] only on formal owners and disadvantage the
other tenure forms, primarily renters."24'
Applying principles of land and property restitution in Haiti therefore
requires expanding those principles beyond the circumstances in which they
were developed. This is necessarily difficult, but humanitarian actors are
nonetheless making creative attempts to work restitutionary principles into
the reconstruction picture. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UNHCR), for instance, argues that housing policy should
focus on restoring renters (as well as owners) to the status quo ante,
essentially through restitution of pre-earthquake tenancy status. 242 Taking a
broad view of Pinheiro, humanitarian officials argue that "housing and
property restitution must be understood to include the restitution of any
right to tenure related to housing or land prior to disaster, irrespective of
tenure status or whether the land or housing is formally registered." 24 3
There have been attempts to "operationalize" this approach, by tying
reconstruction assistance to promises by landlords to rent the rebuilt
structures to their original tenants at a pre-earthquake rate. 2 44
238. See supra Part II.B.

239. This is because the principles include renters' and non-owners' rights in a separate and
somewhat isolated section. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, 2011, supra note 217, at T 27.
240. Id. 28.
241. PROTECTION CLUSTER: HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY WORKING GROUP, ISSUE OF
RENTERS IN THE POST-DISASTER SCENARIO 1-2 (2010).
HOUSING
RETURN
AND
ON
THE NEIGHBORHOOD
COMMENTS
242. UNCHR,
RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK 6 (2010) (on file with author).

243. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur,2011, supra note 217, at 1 29.
244. See, e.g., INTERIM HAITI RECOVERY COMMISSION, NEIGHBORHOOD RETURN AND
HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK 13 (2010) ("To support permanent return for tenants, a
targeted program of support for repair and reconstruction of rental housing will be offered"
bundled with "[n]egotiated agreements between landlords and tenants to support early return ...
without distorting the rental market."), available at http://www.nd.edul-ce4haitilWorking%
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These attempts to apply a restitutionary framework to Haiti's
profoundly informal and unsettled land and housing markets are certainly
innovative, interesting, and probably positive, but it is hard to say whether
they will work. In a larger sense, it is unclear whether it is really worth
framing the whole issue this way, given the distance between restitution's
formal roots and practical realities on the ground in Port-au-Prince. Unlike
the formal, fully "operationalized" mechanisms in Bosnia and Kosovo, talk
of restitution for renters and informal occupants in Haiti risks becoming a
set of legal norms that are positive in theory, but impossible to adapt to the
practical concerns of those most at need for relief.
C. Property, Adequate Housing, and the Problem of Secondary
Displacement
Third, the unique and unprecedented situation of IDPs in Haiti creates
a situation where many of the norms and values underlying the Pinheiro
principles-and restitution more generally-find themselves in a position
of considerable internal tension. Specifically, the right to property and the
right to adequate housing, the two norms which underpin the theory of
restitution, fray when confronted with mass, non-culpable secondary
occupation. 245
In a sense, the entire crisis of displacement and forced eviction in Haiti
turns on questions of secondary occupation and the resulting conflict of
rights and interests. But again, the historical antecedents relied on in
formulating the Pinheiro Principles do not align with the actual situation
facing displaced Haitians. Pinheiro and its antecedents frame secondary
occupation as a second violation of the rights of the primary victims. 24 6
Victims of ethnic cleansing in the Bosnia, for example, found their homes
occupied by members of the ethnic group responsible for their
displacement. 2 47 Similar patterns have unfolded in Sudan, East Timor, and
20Groups/PlanningZoning/Framework.pdf. See also WORLD BANK, URBAN COMMUNITY
DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (PRODEPUR), RESTRUCTURING PAPER ON A PROPOSED
PROJECT RESTRUCTURING OF HAITI 6 (OCT. 21, 2011) (describing project conditioning

reconstruction grants on rental agreements with former tenants).
245. Secondary occupants can be described generally as "those who take up residence in a
home or on land after the legitimate owners or users have fled" or otherwise been forced out of
possession. Todd Wassell, Protecting housing rights for IDPs in Sri Lanka, 33 FORCED
MIGRATION
REV.
6,
8 (2009),
available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/

FMR33/FMR33.pdf. For a discussion of the property and housing rights roots of restitution, see
Paglione, supra note 147, at 395-97.
246. See Explanatory Note, supra note 179, at 63 (noting that secondary occupation occurs
following "forced displacement, forced eviction, violence or threat of violence" and that
"[s]econdary occupation may at times occur when the perpetrators of human rights abuses forcibly
evict residents and subsequently loot property and move into the abandoned homes themselves.").
247. See Williams, Post-Conflict, supra note 159, at 476 (describing how secondary
occupation of abandoned housing became a tool for the consolidation of ethnic cleansing).
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Kosovo. 2 4 8 The take-over of land by secondary occupiers is thus the kind of
"arbitrar[y] or unlawful[]" deprivation the Pinheiro principles intend to
remedy.249
The rights of secondary occupiers are not a nullity, and the Pinheiro
principles recognize that they have certain rights to protection and due
process. 2 50 When the rights of legitimate victims and the rights of
secondary occupiers come into conflict, however, there is no question of
whose rights must yield. As the Pinheiro Handbook describes it, while
"lawful evictions should only be carried out as a last resort, it needs to be
recognized that enforcing the restitution rights of a refugee or displaced
person with a legitimate restitution claim . . . may require the eviction of the

current occupant of the home or land concerned." 2 5 1 The Pinheiro
principles themselves recognize that rights extended to secondary occupiers
"do not prejudice the rights of legitimate owners, tenants and other rights
holders to repossess the housing, land and property in question." 252 When
evicting secondary occupiers, states are to exercise particular care to ensure
that secondary occupiers not be evicted into homelessness. 253 However, the
lack of housing alternatives for secondary occupiers is not sufficient to
stymie legitimate right-holders from restitution of their land and propertythe fact that secondary occupiers may become homeless does not per se
prevent land restitution.2 54
Favoring original rights-holders over secondary occupiers is
understandable in situations of mass displacement following conflict-after
248. According to the UNHCR handbook elaborating the recommended practical
implementation of the Pinheiro principles, "large-scale secondary occupation has hampered return
efforts in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Rwanda, Bhutan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo
and elsewhere." UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES
AND DISPLACED PERSONS IMPLEMENTING THE 'PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES' 81 (2007) [hereinafter
PINHEIRO HANDBOOK].

249. Pinheiro Principles, supra note 10, at 1.1.
250. Id. at 17.1 ("States should ensure that secondary occupants are protected against
arbitrary or unlawful forced eviction."). See also Explanatory Note, supra note 179, at % 63-64
("[O]ften, secondary occupiers are themselves displaced persons. . . . In all cases, however,
secondary occupants must be protected against forced evictions and must benefit from the
procedural protections outlined in general comment No. 7."). As described by the Pinheiro
handbook, secondary occupiers are temporarily vested with "interim" or "qualified" rights
pending reallocation of land or housing to its rightful owner. PINHEIRO HANDBOOK, supra note
248, at 77.
251. PINHEIRO HANDBOOK, supra note 248, at 40.

252. Pinheiro Principles, supra note 10, at 17.2.
253. Id. at 17.3 ("States should take positive measures to protect those who do not have the
means to access any other adequate housing other than that which they are currently occupying
from homelessness and other violations of their right to adequate housing."); Explanatory Notes,
supra note 179, at 64 ("States should adopt adequate measures to protect secondary occupiers
against homelessness, unreasonable relocation and other violations of their human rights.").
254. Id. ("Lack of [housing] alternatives, however, should not unnecessarily delay . . .
housing, land and property restitution.").
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all, secondary occupation may be used as a tactic to cement ethnic
dislocation 2 55 and some (although by no means all) secondary occupiers
may share a degree of moral culpability with the perpetrators of
displacement. 25 6 However, the situation is different in the context of postdisaster displacement. In its land guidance document for humanitarian
practitioners, for instance, U.N. Habitat describes the risk of secondary
occupation as less acute in post-disaster settings (although recognizing that
is by no means eliminated).2 57 Likewise, secondary occupiers who enter
land following a disaster are likely to be less compromised through
association with the perpetrators of displacement (although there remains a
risk for opportunistic land-grabbing in the chaos and confusion following
natural disaster-caused displacement as well). 2 58
In the unique context of Haiti's post-earthquake scenario, these
background assumptions are called into question. To begin with, secondary
occupation of land by displaced persons in Haiti is not the exception, but
the rule. As the damage from the earthquake fell with exceptional force
upon urban Port-au-Prince-a city already facing a drastic shortage of
housing and livable land even before the earthquake 259-the resulting
displacement is concentrated within already densely populated areas.26 0
While many displaced persons left the urban Port-au-Prince area, taking
refuge with family members in the countryside, 2 61 the majority of those
rendered homeless by the quake remained in the city for want of anywhere
else to go and lack of means to get there.262 In an urban environment
already saturated with complex and frequently competing ownership
claims, the unavoidable result was extralegal mass occupation of mostly
255. See Explanatory Note, supra note 179, 1 63 ("Secondary occupation may at times occur
when the perpetrators of human rights abuses forcibly evict residents and subsequently loot
property and move into the abandoned homes themselves.").
256. The UNHCR emphasizes that many, and perhaps most, secondary occupants are not
themselves the perpetrators of human rights violations. On the contrary, most are themselves
displaced by conflict and acting under coercion. PINHEIRO HANDBOOK, supra note 248, at 82.
Nevertheless, there is likely to be a closer nexus between secondary occupation and moral
culpability in post-conflict displacement as compared to post-disaster displacement.
257. UN HABITAT, LAND AND NATURAL DISASTERS: GUIDANCE FOR PRACTITIONERS 9

(2010) ("The sudden onset nature of many natural disasters and their typically relatively localized
impact reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk that abandoned land or housing will be occupied
by persons other than the pre-displacement owner (i.e. 'secondary occupiers.')").
258. See FAN, supra note 116, at 17-18 (describing threat of land grabbing in Haiti); LAND
TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN HAITI, ISSUE BRIEF, USAID 3 (2010) (same).

259. See supra Part Ill.C.
260. Maurice Herson, Using Standards to Shape Response and Recovery in Haiti, 34
FORCED MIGRATION REV. 50 (2010).
261. See Deborah Sontag, Rural Haiti Struggles to Absorb Displaced, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/world/americas/17rural.html (describing
displacement from urban Port-au-Prince to rural Haiti).
262. See Herson, supra note 260, at 50-51.
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private land by over a million newly displaced individuals. 26 3
Major displacements camps exist on both private and publicallyowned land. Public land is home to many of the largest and most visible
IDP camps,264 as well as many of its most infamous forced eviction
campaigns. 2 6 5 In terms of numbers, however, the great majority of Haiti's
1,600 registered displacement camps exist on privately owned land, and it is
in these camps where the surge in forced evictions has been most heavily
felt.2 66 According to a Haitian human rights organization, 90% of forced
evictions target camps on private, and not public, land.267 Of course, one
must be careful to use the term "landowner" carefully, as individuals
asserting ownership of land occupied by displaced persons are generally
unable to meet Haiti's legal standard for proof of ownership.268 According
to a study by the U.N.'s Protection Cluster, only 20% to 30% of purported
landowners are able to produce property records establishing ownership. 2 6 9
This comes as no surprise given the extremely weak formalization of
property rights that predated the earthquake. 27 0
The reality of mass occupation of private land by displaced persons
complicates the perpetrator/victim dichotomy implicit in the mainstream
approach to secondary occupation. Under the mainstream approach to
restitution, secondary occupiers may be considered victims themselves, 27 1
and have rights that must be respected,2 72 but critically, it is those originally
263. Id. at 50-5 1.
264. See PHILIPS, HOUSING supra note 144 (discussing evictions plans for six highly visible
displacement camps on public land).
265. See Letter from Jeena Shah, Staff Attorney, Institute for Justice and Democracy in
Haiti, to IACHR, available at http://ijdh.org/archives/20551 (describing forced eviction of
displacement camp at Sylvio Cator Stadium.
266. FORCED EVICTIONS MEMO, INST. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAM 3 (2011) (on
file with author); INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, CAMP COORDINATION AND
CAMP MANAGEMENT CLUSTER, REPORT: EVICTIONS IN IDP CAMPS 2 (2011) ("78% of camps
currently threatened with eviction are privately owned whereas only 7% of camps threatened with
eviction are publicly owned.").
267. Id.
268. See Nicole Philips et al., Enforcing Remedies from the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights: Forced Evictions and Post-EarthquakeHaiti, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 13, 13 (2011)
("Many evictions are being carried out by private individuals who do not have rights to the land
where the camps are located. Since only five percent of Haiti's land was officially recorded before
the earthquake, and land records themselves are often contested, it is difficult in most cases to
establish a clear and legitimate chain of title."). See also HOUSING UPR, supra note 54;
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, DEPT. OF STATE MODERNIZATION AND GOVERNANCE,
MODERNIZATION OF CADASTRE AND LAND RIGHTS INFRASTRUCTURE IN HAITI: A RAPID AND
INCLUSIVE APPROACH 10 (2010) (decrying lack of functional system for proving land rights).
269. PROTECTION CLUSTER, HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY WORKING GROUP, ISSUE OF
RENTERS INTHE POST-DISASTER SCENARIO 2 (2010).
270. See supra Part II.B-C.
271. See, e.g., PINHEIRO HANDBOOK, supra note 248, at 86.
272. Id. at 77.
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divested of their land and property who are the primary victims and whose
rights will, under the law of restitution, ultimately prevail. 2 73 This approach
may make sense in situations where the human needs of land rights-holders
and secondary occupiers are roughly balanced, and the legal right to
ownership can function as a tie-breaker-as was the case in Bosnia and
Kosovo. But it is deeply problematic in Haiti, where those divested of
privately owned land through mass secondary occupation are largely from
the most privileged and powerful strata of Haitian society, and the
secondary occupiers themselves from its most vulnerable. 2 74 It is true, in
theory at least, that displaced persons possess the right to restitution of
whatever tenure status they enjoyed prior to the earthquake,275 and
humanitarian organizations have attempted to find ways to operationalize
this right.276 But the rights of displaced secondary occupiers to their
previous (often no longer existent) homes is largely an abstract and
unenforceable one, especially compared to the more practical 'right' of
purported landowners to retake possession of their land through violence
and manipulation of Haiti's largely (although not entirely) pliable courts. 27 7
Indeed, while not expressly referencing Pinheiro or restitutionary
principles, landowners' arguments in favor of eviction frequently 'sound' in
restitution-one landowner asserted that conducting evictions could not be
illegal, because he was only retaking what rightfully was his, 2 78 and the
Mayor of Port-au-Prince justified the eviction of a camp at Haiti's national
stadium as "restoring" the rights of Haitian football fans. 279
273. See Pinheiro Principles, supra note 10, at 17.3.
274. See Meena Jagannath, Nicole Phillips, & Jeena Shah, A Rights-Based Approach to
Lawyering: Legal Empowerment as an Alternative to Legal Aid in Post-Disaster Haiti, 10 Nw. U.
J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 7, 13 (2011) (describing particular impact of displacement and subsequent
public health risks on Haiti's poor); but cf USAID, HOUSING FOR HAITI'S MIDDLE CLASS, POSTEARTHQUAKE DIAGNOSIS AND STRATEGY (2010) (arguing that among all the earthquake's
victims, the "middle class may actually have been most devastated. Many middle-class families
suffered not only the loss and injury of loved ones but also the loss of their greatest material

asset-their house.").
275. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, 2011, supra note 217, at

29 (so arguing).

276. See, e.g., INTERIM HAITI RECOVERY COMMISSION , NEIGHBORHOOD RETURN AND
HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK 13 (2010); WORLD BANK, URBAN COMMUNITY
DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (PRODEPUR), RESTRUCTURING PAPER ON A PROPOSED

PROJECT RESTRUCTURING OF HAITI 6 (OCT. 21, 2011) (describing project conditioning
reconstruction grants on rental agreements with former tenants).
277. See Feburary 2012 IACHR letter, supra note 50, at 3 (discussing participation of
'justices of the peace' in forced eviction at Barbancourt II camp); Philips, Enforcing, supra note
268, at 13 ("[Tjhe elitist legal system in Haiti favors the interests of the rich, there are very few
public interest lawyers to take on pro bono eviction cases, and most Haitians have little to no
access to the formal justice system.").
278. See Robyn Kerr, Haitians helping Haitians as eviction looms, RELIEFWEB.NET, Apr.
27, 2011, available at http://reliefweb.int/node/398650.
279. See Mayor of P-au-P Launches Eviction Operations at Sylvio Cator Stadium,
DEFEND.HT, July 15, 2011, available at http://defend.ht/politics/articles/municipal/1383-mayor-
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The legal dilemma posed by secondary occupation is so acute because
it lays bare a fault line running through the legal foundations of the
restitution itself. As Giulia Paglione has described, restitution as a legal
concept has roots in both the right to property and the right to adequate
housing. 2 80 In many situations of mass displacement (and certainly the
kinds of displacement settings envisioned by the framers of the Pinheiro
Principles) these two legal principles will, in effect, pull in the same
direction-the return of land and property will also restore displaced
persons to adequate housing, and vice versa. 28 1 But in Haiti, where property
owners are not the primary victims, and the primary victims are not
property owners, 2 82 the right to adequate housing and the right to property
pull apart.
Displaced persons' right to adequate housing (and their rights to water,
food, and sanitation) should support a moratorium on evictions and a focus
on ameliorating the conditions of IDPs whereever they are.283 By contrast,
the right to property favors landowners, who have now been ousted from
their land, property, and sometimes businesses for over three years, and
have little hope of repossession save through unseemly self-help
methods.2 84 Both sides have claims that are valid. But the application of
restitution would favor the more powerful and less vulnerable party, putting
it in tension with the principle that in disasters, the needs of the most
vulnerable must come first.2 85
D. Deserving and Undeserving Victims
Mirroring the distinction between secondary occupiers and 'legitimate'
rights-holders, a restitutionary approach also risks drawing an inaccurate
and potentially harmful distinction between the needs of those displaced by

of-p-au-p-launches-eviction-operations-at-sylvio-cator-stadium ("The director of the stadium,
Rolny St. Louis said he was pleased that the stadium is finally about to be released from its
occupants. He said that the presence of victims in the courtyard of the stadium was a violation of
the rights of footballers and lovers of the sport.").
280. Paglione, supra note 147, at 393. See supra Part Ill.
281. In practice, many restitution beneficiaries promptly sell their land and property; as a
result the return to land to people does not necessarily result in the return of people to land. See
Part Ill.
282. See Jagannath,supra note 274, at T 13 (noting particular impact of disaster on Haiti's
poor).
283. See Shah, supra note 265, (advocating for evictions moratorium on behalf of displaced
Haitians).
284. See PINHEIRO HANDBOOK, supra note 248 at 44 (describing legitimate right to property
restitution as trumping occupancy rights of extra-lawful secondary occupiers). It is worth
repeating that only a minority of landowners in Port-au-Prince have resorted to forced or
constructive evictions of displaced persons. Indeed, many landowners have shown generosity and
solidarity towards IDPs. See Kerr, supra note 278.
285. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur,2010, supra note 217, T 35.
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the earthquake itself, and those for whom the earthquake was merely the
indirect cause of displacement. Many humanitarian officials already
subscribe to this division, arguing that many, if not most, of the displaced
persons remaining in certain camps are not truly deserving victims, and
therefore have a lesser claim to protection and provision of services. The
statement of Cheryl Mills, chief of staff for then-U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton, is emblematic of this attitude: "We've been trying
to incentivize people to return to their homes, particularly if their homes
have been adjudicated as safe, [b]ut people seek to remain in the temporary
communities because, as surprising as that might seem outside of Haiti, life
is better for many of them now." 286 Even the Special Rapporteur on
Housing has expressed suspicion about undeserving persons taking
advantage of the aid effort. 2 87 The concern is that services in camps-as
limited as they are-nevertheless represent a modest windfall opportunity
for individuals whose economic precarity predates the earthquake.
The governmental and humanitarian treatment of the Canaan Camp
(Canaraan, in Krbyol) is an example of the deserving/underserving
distinction in action. In efforts to remove displaced persons from urban
camps in Port-au-Prince, humanitarian organizations, with the aid of the
Haitian government, effected a large-scale transfer of several thousand
people to an empty stretch of land ten kilometers north of the city.288 At the
newly created Corail "model-camp," NGOs Oxfam and World Vision
provided tents, water, and limited food aid.289 The Corail project itself has
subsequently come under strong criticism-particularly allegations that it
effectively marooned five thousand people in a barren and flood-prone
patch of land, far from health or education services, economic activity, or

286. Lois Romano, State Department'sCheryl Mills on Rebuilding Haiti, WASH. POST, May
20, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/
AR2010050903009.html. Some commentators have compared this comment to Barbara Bush's
infamous observation that New Orleans residents displaced to Texas by hurricane Katrina were
"so overwhelmed by [Texas] hospitality . .. [a]nd so many of the people in the arena here, you
know, were underprivileged anyway so this - this is working very well for them." See Beverly
Bell, Citizen Mobilizationfor Housing in Haiti, HUFFINGTON POST, July 30, 2010, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beverly-bell/citizen-mobilization-for b_664893.html.
287. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur,2011, supra note 217, at 17 ("With the earthquake,
many of the residents moved to camps, either because their homes or neighbourhoods had been
destroyed or damaged, or in order to be able to receive food or medical assistance, to take part in
cash-for-work programmes, to save on rent (in the case of renters) or in the hope of receiving a
house.").
288. Ezra Fraser, Camp Corail: Haiti's Good Idea Gone Wrong, GLOBAL POST, Dec. 7,
2010, availableat http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/americas/101206/haiti-camp-corail.
289. A year later, food aid and water are no longer provided to camp residents, and the tents
have been replaced with most-permanent T-Shelters. See Janet Reitman, Beyond Relief How the
World Failed Haiti, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 4, 2011, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/
politics/news/how-the-world-failed-haiti-20110804.
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income-generating opportunities.2 90
Whatever its problems, residents of Camp Corail at least enjoyed
recognition as legitimate earthquake victims, able to make proper claims on
the humanitarian community for aid.2 91 For residents of the much larger,
un-planned camps that spontaneously sprung up around edges of Corail, the
situation is very different. Drawn by (ultimately false) rumors of housing,
food aid, and factory construction, perhaps 25,000 people moved into
sprawling, decidedly "un-model" camps which now enclose Corail on all
sides.29 2 Unlike the "legitimate" disaster victims of Corail, residents in the
Canaraan camps found themselves frequently derided as squatters, landgrabbers, and opportunists-individuals who may not have actually lost
their homes in the earthquake and who are therefore not entitled to
earthquake relief.293 Accordingly, the Haitian government and the U.N.'s
Office of Humanitarian Coordination strictly limited the ability of
humanitarian organizations to provide services in Canaraan--only a
handful of "outlaw" NGOs are even trying.294 In urban Port-au-Prince,
some government and humanitarian officials level similar charges at
displaced people there, accusing residents of setting up "ghost tents" in
efforts to secure aid and free housing.295
On one level, these concerns are easy to rebuff. No food aid has been
distributed in the camps since March of 20 10,296 and the vast majority of
290. See Beyond Belief supra note 289. See also Georgianne Neinaber, New Haiti Cholera
Warning, Vaccine Questions, and "Squatters" Vulnerable, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 13, 2010,

available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/georgianne-nienaber/new-haiti-cholera-waming-b795815.html; Mark Schuller, Rained Out? Opportunities in Haiti Washed Away, HUFFINGTON

POST, July 21, 2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-schuller/rained-outopportunities_b_653672.html ("There is no economic activity at all outside the camp, no market,
no stores, no schools, not even a church. The camp, itself is built near Titanyen, the mass burial
ground used by paramilitaries in the past and by the current government to bury the unmarked,
unnamed, dead from the earthquake.").
291. In fact, Camp Corail was the only camp officially recognized by the government of
Haiti. See Philips, Enforcing, supra note 268, at 1.
292. UN TECHO PARA MI PAIS HAITI, THE CONDITIONS OF THE DISPLACED FAMILIES OF
CANAAN 12 (2011) [hereinafter FAMILIES OF CANAAN]. See also Greger Calhan, Out of Options
in Haiti, INT'L POLICY DIGEST, Sept. 11, 2011, available at http://www.intemationalpolicydigest

.org/2011/09/01/out-of-options-in-haiti.
293. See Reitman, supra note 289. According to the Canaraan residents themselves, at least,
housing destruction in the earthquake is overwhelmingly the cause for their present displacement
to the camp.

See FAMILIES OF CANAAN, supra note 292, at 12 (85% of Canaan respondents

reporting "housing collapsed" as reason for displacement to camp).
294. See Neinaber, supra note 290. These include the Irish NGO Haven, and several small
faith-based groups.
295. See Nowhere to go: The government's housingplanfaces an uphill battle, ECONOMIST,

Sept. 11, 2011, availableat http://www.economist.com/node/21528627.
296. Howard LaFranchi, Aid after Haiti earthquake: President Rend Prival sees need for

shift, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Mar. 10, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Foreign-Policy/2010/03 I 0/Aid-after-Haiti-earthquake-President-Rene-Preval-sees-need-for-shift.
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camps receive no services whatsoever. 2 97 When provided at all, most
services are limited to cash-for-work programs that reach only a minority of
residents, and have little long-term effect on economic conditions. 298 Even
the 'best' camps are marked by crime, flood vulnerability, and unsanitary
conditions.299 It is therefore difficult to seriously believe that anything
more than a handful of people have forsaken otherwise sound housing
options in order to free-ride in the camps.
The more plausible explanation is not that camp residents actually
have housing alternatives which they are choosing not to use,300 but rather
that they are legitimately homeless butfor reasons not proximately resulting
from the earthquake. This rests upon the assumption that only those
'actually' displaced by the earthquake are entitled to aid. Yet the spectrum
of displacement is not so simple. Certainly, families who escaped collapsed
houses are displaced by any measure. For the hundreds of thousands of
Haitians who lived in extreme economic precarity prior to the earthquake,
however, the disaster's devastating effect on livelihoods combined with
skyrocketing rents produced homelessness and displacement no less
desperate than that caused by fallen buildings.30' In the face of this reality,
application of restitutionary norms-even under the expansive view
advocated by the Special Rapporteur on Housing302-puts the focus only on
those whose displacement results from unlawful, or at least arbitrary, acts
and fails to address those whose displacement results from a complex
interplay of political and economic factors. This forces humanitarian
organizations into the difficult and likely impossible position of attempting
to determine whose displacement results from what, and also masks the fact
that the present crisis of displacement, disenfranchisement, and
vulnerability has profound historical roots. 3 0 3

297. Only a small percentage of camps are "managed" by NGOs at all.
298. See UPR LABOR REPORT, supra note 41, at
7-8, 13-17 (describing cash for work
programs and their human rights shortcomings).
299. See CHRGJ Briefing Paper, supra note 31 (finding grim conditions in all camps
surveyed---even ones managed by respected international humanitarian NGOs).
300. Some officials suggest that camp residents have chosen to rent-out their former homes
in order to profit from high-rents, while taking advantage of the opportunity to live rent-free in
camps. See Nowhere To Go, supra note 295.

301. There is a sad history in the United States of using the label of "economic refugees" to
deny Haitians fleeing from political violence their rights under international law. In the 1980s and
1990s, when the Duvalier and subsequent military dictatorships killed and tortured tens of
thousands of Haitian citizens, the United States Coast Guard forcibly repatriated thousands of
Haitians fleeing the violence-branding them "economic migrants" unentitled to the protections
of refugees or asylum seekers. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FUGITIVES FROM INJUSTICE: THE
CRISIS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN HAITI 5 (1994), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/

reports/pdfs/h/haiti/haiti948.pdf
302. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, 2011, supra note 217, at

29.

303. These roots go back to colonialism and the legacy of slavery. See supra Part ll.A.
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Conclusion
No less than other situations of mass displacement, Haiti "provides a
paradigmatic case of the difficulties of implementing international rights to
property question. It squarely raises the question: restitution for whom?" 304
Indeed, I have argued that deep structural differences between Haiti's
current displacement crisis and the restitution antecedents relied on in
Pinheiro call into question the appropriateness of a restitution-centered
approach in Haiti at all. Yet while this paper criticizes the propriety of
restitutionary legal principles for the actual conditions facing Haiti, it is not
intended to be overly critical. Contemporary developments in restitutionary
norms generally, and the Pinheiro Principles in particular, do represent
important developments in international law and contain important
teachings relevant to IDPs in Haiti. Specifically, the sections of Pinheiro
dealing with renters,30 s secondary occupiers,30 6 and persons in irregular
tenure arrangements307 remain important-even if they seem somewhat
secondary to the Principles' main thrust. 308
Providing a detailed prescription for the crisis of housing and
displacement that presently besets Haiti is beyond the scope of this article.
Aside from vexing questions of institutional design and conflicting rights,
the practical challenges of implementing any comprehensive solution to
mass displacement are profound. This is particularly true in a country like
Haiti, which has a history of extreme economic and political
disenfranchisement and heavy-handed interventions by self-interested
foreign powers.309
Nevertheless, meaningful recovery in Haiti means getting questions of
land, property, housing, and employment right. This requires recognition
that the continuing cost of displacement and precarity falls overwhelmingly
on the poor,310 and that the factors leading to the political and economic
disenfranchisement of Haiti's poor majority have deep roots. Even when
acting in perfectly good faith, international organizations' approach to
housing policy and reconstruction easily tends towards favoritism of the
propertied few.3 " Conducting key meetings in French or English, at
304. Daniel Fitzpatrick and Rebecca Monson, Balancing Rights and Norms: Property
Programmingin East Timor, the Solomon Islands, and Bougainville, at 7 (forthcoming).

305. Pinheiro Principles, supra note 10, at 21.
306. Id. 22.
307. Id. 21.
308. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur,2011, supra note 217, at

1 27

(describing bias in

favor of formal land ownership).
309. See Part II (describing historical factors leading to political and economic disparities in
modem Haiti).
310. See Jagannath,supra note 274, at 1 13 (explaining disparate impact on poor).
311. Well-meaning NGOs often take it upon themselves to negotiate with purported
landowners on behalf of camps facing forced evictions. While well-intentioned, this amounts to
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locations difficult to reach from the city, effectively ensures that voices
representing poor and displaced communities are silenced in the debate over
how to proceed.3 12 The relatively uncritical adoption of restitutionary
norms that favor established property interests compounds the problem,
creating space for the powerful to 'assert their rights' at the expense of
those most acutely in need.
What principles should ground land and reconstruction in Haiti then?
A few require mention. First, any attempt to reorganize or formalize land
rights in Haiti must be certain not to bypass the country's legal system, as
foreign NGOs are all too quick to do. 3 13 Flawed though it is, the Haitian
courts represent a vital avenue for defending the rights of Haiti's poor.
Simply enforcing the letter of the law on evictions would suffice to end the
vast majority of them-the great bulk of purported landowners, no less than
their former renters and tenants, lack the documentation necessary to
establish ownership under the law. 3 14 While Haitian courts are vulnerable
to the pressures purported landlords can bring to bear, they have also acted
courageously to prevent forced evictions, 3 1 5 and to hold accountable
perpetrators of human rights violations more generally. 3 16
Second, land titling reform projects must be done carefully. Reducing
evidentiary requirements for establishing landownership would have many
benefits-speeding the transfer of land to business and housing developers.
If done wrongly, however, it will only benefit entrenched elite interests at
the expense of the most vulnerable, enabling evictions to proceed more
easily through the legal system, for example, or placing greater pressure on
playing along with illegal forced evictions, and robs displaced persons of a potential ally and
advocate. See Philips, Enforcing, supra note 268, at I (describing negotiations). Guidelines from
the International Organization for Migration, while intending to protect displaced persons, also
implicitly approve NGO negotiations with purported landowners, a pragmatic response that
nonetheless bypasses the Haitian justice system and marginalizes the displaced communities
themselves. IOM, GUIDELINES: RESPONSE IN CASE OF FORCED Eviction (2011), available at
http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/pdf/DRAFT OperationalGuidelines_onForcedEviction_
March 20.pdf (calling for camp residents to be informed of eviction negotiations, but for NGO to
do actual negotiating).
312. GEOGHEGAN, supra note 101 ("With the exception of the Je Nan Je conference, I have
never seen beneficiary advocates at the meetings with government actors, UN agencies, and
land/property professionals.").
313. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
314. PROTECTION CLUSTER, HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY WORKING GROUP, ISSUE OF
RENTERS INTHE POST-DISASTER SCENARIO 2 (2010). See also Philips, Enforcing,supra note 268,
at I (noting inability of most purported landowners to meet legal evidentiary standard for
ownership).
315. See Philips, Enforcing, supra note 268, at I (describing successful legal tactics against
forced evictions).
316. See Deborah Sontag & Walt Bogdanich, 8 Guilty for PrisonMassacre in Rare Trial of
Haiti's Police, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/
world/americas/7-haitian-policemen-convicted-in-201 I -les-cayes-prison-killings.html?ref-haiti.
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the poor to sell. As a Krbyol proverb has it "nothing separates a poor man
from his land faster than clear tenure."317 A strong court system can keep
things fair-as the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing noted,
"positive legal developments on housing remain inaccessible to the poor so
long as the justice system is weak."3 18
Lastly, any attempt to remedy displacement and forced evictions in
Haiti must operate with awareness of the exploitation and historical
disenfranchisement visited upon its poor majority. Accordingly, as a
general principle, when the right to housing for the displaced conflicts with
land and property restitution for the powerful, housing for the poor needs to
take precedence. Human rights norms recognize that post-disaster states
owe "particular obligation to protect vulnerable members of society." 319
That is, if the property and housing principles underlying restitution
begin to pull in opposite directions, then the housing principle ought to pull
ahead.320 Certainly land owners may have valid interests, and individual
cases may go either way, but the cost of delay in housing reconstruction
must not be borne by the most vulnerable. This means some camps will
inevitably become quasi-permanent, at least in the near term, but many
observers believe that this is likely to happen anyway, and should be dealt
with openly. 32 1 It may seem perverse to argue for displaced persons' right
to remain in squalid and dangerous camps. However, where IDPs are settled
and compelled by poverty and lack of alternatives to remain, the decision to
322
stay may be the best of bad options and merits respect.

317. GEOGHEGAN, supra note 312.
318. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur,2010, supra note 217, at 135.
319. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., GeneralComment 3: The natureof States

partiesobligations, 12, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990). See also U.N. Comm. On the
Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:

Mozambique, 1 20, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/MOX/CO/2 (Oct. 2009) (describing special obligations
towards children following natural disasters); U.N. Comm. On the Rights of the Child,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Philippines, 1 60, U.N.

Doc. CRC/C/PHL/CO/3-4 (Oct. 2, 2009) (same).
320. See Part IV.C.
321. Kllin Memo, supra note 47, at T 62.
322. See Rep. ofthe Special Rapporteur, 2010, supra note 217, at T 65.

